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TAX  POLICY  AND  TAX  REFORM are important  items on the current  policy 
agenda. In evaluating alternative tax policies, decisionmakers must 
consider both their normative  and positive impact;  in particular,  they 
must  examine  the effects of competing  policies on the overall  well-being 
of the taxpayers  and on various indexes of economic activity, in both 
the short  run  and  long run. 
Basic to understanding  the impact of tax policy is analysis of the 
relationship  between taxation  and  taxpayers'  decisions about  consump- 
tion, saving, and work effort. Such analysis is especially sensitive to 
assumptions  made  regarding  individuals'  abilities  to use capital  markets 
to transfer  income across time. By the same token, we think  that  policy 
simulation  models that ignore "liquidity  constraints" result in flawed 
tax policy analysis. In this paper we analyze the impact of liquidity 
constraints on consumption functions and use the resulting view of 
aggregate  demand to address two categories of tax and fiscal policy 
issues. 
The first  issue is developing  a tax system that  least reduces taxpayer 
well-being  for the amount  of lifetime revenue extracted. Recent appli- 
cations of theoretically  based models of individual  behavior  have facili- 
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tated  comparisons  of the effects of alternative  policies. Indeed, much  of 
the present debate over the relative reliance on various tax bases and 
the optimal  degree  of progressivity  of the income tax has been reflected 
in studies  using  policy-simulation  models.  I 
These models  generally  assume that individuals  or households  maxi- 
mize well-being  over their lifetime, subject only to the restriction  that 
the present  value of consumption  is no greater  than  the present  value of 
income. The models then assess how tax policies can alter  the rewards 
to saving and working,  thereby distorting  intertemporal  choices about 
consumption  and  work  effort.  But  models  with  an  overall  lifetime  budget 
constraint  ignore the many restrictions  on individuals'  ability to shift 
income in a world of capital market imperfections, restrictions that 
substantially  affect those intertemporal  choices.2 Taking  into account 
the effect of liquidity  constraints  affects the calculation  of the welfare 
costs of taxation  substantially;  prevailing  arguments,  based on "perfect 
market"  models, against  capital  taxation  or progressive  income  taxation 
and in favor of wage and consumption  taxation must be substantially 
muted  and  often reversed.3 
The second issue that we examine is the importance  of liquidity 
constraints  for the debate  over the impact  of temporary  tax cuts financed 
by debt. We show that liquidity-constraint  considerations  are quantita- 
tively more important  than the frequently discussed "finite-horizon" 
considerations  that  focus on how debt shifts the tax burden  onto future 
generations.  We  also  find  that  when  both  considerations  are  incorporated 
1. See, for example, Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Capital  Taxation  and Accumulation 
in a Life Cycle Growth  Model,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 71 (September  1981), 
pp. 533-44; Alan J. Auerbach  and Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  "National  Savings,  Economic 
Welfare,  and  the Structure  of Taxation,"  in Martin  Feldstein,  ed., Behavioral  Simuilation 
Methods  in Tax Policy  Analysis  (University  of Chicago Press,  1983), pp. 459-93;  Alan 
J. Auerbach,  Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and Jonathan  Skinner,  "The Efficiency  Gains  from 
Dynamic  Tax Reform," International  Economic  Review, vol. 24 (February  1983),  pp. 
81-100; and E. John Driffill  and Harvey S. Rosen, "Taxation  and Excess Burden:  A 
Life Cycle Perspective," International  Economic  Review, vol. 24 (October 1983),  pp. 
671-83. 
2.  See, for example,  the earlier  analysis  by James  Tobin  and Walter  Dolde, "Wealth, 
Liquidity and Consumption,"  in Consumer Spending and Monetazy Policy: The Linkages 
(Federal  Reserve Bank of Boston, 1971),  pp. 99-146. 
3. This issue is discussed with respect to the social security  payroll  tax in R. Glenn 
Hubbard  and Kenneth  L. Judd, "Social Security  and Individual  Welfare:  Precautionary 
Saving, Liquidity  Constraints,  and the Payroll Tax," Working  Paper 1736 (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research, October 1985). R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  3 
into the consumption function, debt-financed  tax cuts of  the type 
observed  in  the  post-World  War  II  era  do not  substantially  alter  aggregate 
consumption. 
In this light, the plan  of the paper  is as follows. First, we elaborate  on 
the potential macroeconomic  importance  of liquidity constraints and 
their role in tax policy analysis in life-cycle consumption  models. We 
then  develop a simple  life-cycle model  to examine  the effects of liquidity 
constraints  on measures  of national  saving and individual  welfare. We 
focus on the life-cycle model because of its easy applicability  to fiscal 
policy analysis. Use of this model introduces no bias a priori in our 
examination  of the effects of liquidity  constraints, since the life-cycle 
model  under  rational  expectations  and  with  perfect  capital  markets  offers 
fiscal  policy little scope in influencing  consumption.  We consider three 
major applications:  the relative welfare costs of capital versus labor 
income taxation, effects of progressive versus proportional  income 
taxation,  and  effects of temporary  tax changes  on consumption. 
Liquidity Constraints  and Consumption 
The effect of  liquidity constraints, defined in various ways,  on 
consumer  spending  has been considered  in many studies.4  In response 
to Robert Lucas's critique of econometric policy evaluation, Robert 
Hall proposed  the "Euler  equation"  approach  to testing  the sensitivity 
of consumption to current income changes.5 In Hall's model, to be 
4. For a general discussion, see Tobin and Dolde, "Wealth, Liquidity  and Con- 
sumption";  Alan  S. Blinder,  "Intergenerational  Transfers  and  Life Cycle  Consumption," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  66 (May  1976, Papers  and Proceedings,  1975), pp. 
87-93; Walter Dolde, "Capital Markets and the Short Run Behavior of Life Cycle 
Savers," Journal of Finance, vol. 33 (May 1978), pp. 413-28; and Fumio Hayashi, 
"Tests for Liquidity  Constraints:  A Critical  Survey," Working  Paper 1720 (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  October 1985). 
5. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation:  A Critique," in Karl 
Brunner and Allan H.  Meltzer,  eds.,  The Phillips  Curve and Labor Markets,  Carnegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol.  1 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 
1976),  pp. 19-46; Robert  E. Hall, "Stochastic  Implications  of the Life Cycle-Permanent 
Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 86 
(December  1978),  pp. 971-87. For a discussion  of econometric  problems  (in particular, 
aggregation  issues) with Euler equation methods, see Angus S. Deaton, "Life-Cycle 
Models of Consumption:  Is the Evidence Consistent with the Theory?" (Princeton 
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consistent  with the permanent-income  hypothesis  under  rational  expec- 
tations  (with  no borrowing  restrictions),  conditional  on lagged  consump- 
tion, expected consumption should be independent of other lagged 
information. Other empirical studies find consumer spending to be 
sensitive  to income  changes.6 Findings  of excess sensitivity  of consump- 
tion to changes  in disposable  income are  corroborated  in a study  of food 
expenditures  by Hall and  Frederic  Mishkin.7 
Our  analysis  is predicated  on the idea that  this excess sensitivity can 
be traced  to the operation  of liquidity  constraints,  the aggregate  impor- 
tance of which for the United States is amply illustrated  by historical 
evidence. Bradford  DeLong and Lawrence Summers note that from 
1899 to  1916, "essentially all consumption was done by liquidity- 
constrained  consumers.'  '8  Their  findings  for the entire  pre-World  War 
II period broadly support  this conclusion and suggest the possibility, 
which  we consider  in  our  simulation  exercises, that  forced  lifetime  saving 
(that  is, underconsumption)  by consumers  who are  liquidity  constrained 
may be an important  component of total saving. For example, Alan 
Auerbach  and  Laurence  Kotlikoff  note that  personal  saving  rates in the 
United States exceeded 20 percent  during  the 1880s-before the availa- 
bility  of consumer  credit  and  the pursuit  of stabilization  policy  .9 
Fumio  Hayashi  finds  that  liquidity-constrained  consumers  accounted 
for approximately  20 percent of all consumption  in post-World War  II 
United  States.  10  In a separate  effort  using  microeconomic  data, Hayashi 
6. Marjorie  A. Flavin, "The Adjustment  of Consumption  to Changing  Expectations 
about Future  Income,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 89 (October  1981),  pp. 974- 
1009;  Fumio  Hayashi, "The Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Estimation  and Testing  by 
Instrumental  Variables,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (October  1982),  pp. 895- 
916; Lars Peter  Hansen  and Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "Generalized  Instrumental  Variables 
Estimation  of Nonlinear  Rational  Expectations  Models," Econometrica,  vol. 50 (Sep- 
tember 1982), pp. 1269-86; Alan S.  Blinder and Angus Deaton, "The Time Series 
Consumption  Function  Revisited,"  BPEA,  2:1985, pp. 465-511. 
7.  Robert E. Hall and Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Sensitivity of Consumption  to 
Transitory  Income:  Estimates  from Panel  Data on Households,"  Econometrica,  vol. 50 
(March  1982),  pp. 461-81. 
8. J.  Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H.  Summers, "The Changing Cyclical 
Variability  of Economic Activity in the United States," in Robert  J. Gordon,  ed., The 
American Business  Cycle: Continuity and Change (University  of Chicago  Press, 1986). 
9. Auerbach  and Kotlikoff, "National  Savings." 
10. Hayashi, "The Permanent  Income Hypothesis." Moreover, using the NIPA 
definition  of personal consumption  expenditures,  which excludes service flows from 
consumer  durables  and includes expenditures  on consumer  durables,  he finds that 96 R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  5 
also notes that the relationship between consumption and income 
movements differs significantly  for "high saving" and "low saving" 
families.11  Ben Bernanke  finds no evidence that the permanent-income 
hypothesis needs to be amended  for liquidity  constraints  in his exami- 
nation  of individual  expenditures  on automobiles.12 Automobile  loans, 
however, are self-collateralized,  and our focus is on the unavailability 
of noncollateralized  consumption  loans. Marjorie  Flavin finds that the 
estimate  of the marginal  propensity  to consume is affected  dramatically 
by the inclusion  of proxies  for liquidity  constraints  .13 In her  econometric 
work, Flavin uses the aggregate unemployment  rate as a proxy for 
liquidity  constraints  and  tests "myopia" and  liquidity-constraint  expla- 
nations  of the excess sensitivity  findings.  She reports  that  the estimated 
marginal  propensity  to consume out of transitory  income is explained 
almost  entirely  by proxies  for liquidity  constraints. 
We analyze the liquidity constraint arising from a nonnegativity 
constraint  on net  worth.  14 That  is, consumers  are  not  permitted  to borrow 
against income to be received in the future; current consumption is 
percent of personal consumption  expenditures  could be due to liquidity-constrained 
households. 
11. Fumio  Hayashi,  "The Effect of Liquidity  Constraints  on Consumption:  A Cross- 
Sectional  Analysis,"  Quarterly Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  100 (February  1985), pp. 
183-206. David  Runkle  and Stephen  Zeldes also find  that the sensitivity  of consumption 
to changes in income depends on household wealth. See David Runkle, "Liquidity 
Constraints  and  the Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Evidence  from  Panel  Data" (Brown 
University, 1983); Stephen Zeldes,  "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An 
Empirical  Investigation"  (Wharton  School, University  of Pennsylvania,  1985). 
12. Ben S. Bernanke, "Permanent  Income, Liquidity,  and Expenditure  on Auto- 
mobiles:  Evidence  from  Panel Data," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 99 (August 
1984), pp. 587-614. 
13. Marorie Flavin, "Excess  Sensitivity of  Consumption to  Current Income: 
Liquidity  Constraints  or Myopia?"  Working  Paper 1341  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  May 1984). 
14. This assumption  is also used in the tax analysis work of Feldstein and Daniel 
Feenberg. See also the macroeconomic  model of Carl Walsh and the analyses of the 
social security payroll tax by Hubbard  and Judd. Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. 
Feenberg,  "Alternative  Tax Rules  and  Personal  Saving  Incentives:  Microeconomic  Data 
and Behavioral  Simulations,"  in Feldstein, ed., Behavioral Simulation  Methods, pp. 
173-210:  Carl  E. Walsh, "Borrowing  Restrictions  and Wealth  Constraints:  Implications 
for Aggregate Consumption," Working Paper 1629 (National Bureau of  Economic 
Research,  June 1985);  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  "Social Security, Liquidity  Constraints,  and 
Pre-Retirement  Consumption,"  Southern  Economic Journal, vol. 52 (October 1985), 
pp. 471-83; Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
limited  by current  resources. For consumers  who cannot finance  their 
desired level  of  consumption with current wealth, consumption is 
responsive  to changes, even anticipated  changes, in disposable  income. 
This particular  notion  of liquidity  constraints  does not reflect  problems 
of imperfect  information  in loan markets;  indeed, we will be working 
with earnings  profiles that are known to consumers with perfect cer- 
tainty.  15  Rather,  we appeal  to large  transactions  costs and  the possibility 
of bankruptcy  in explaining  borrowing  restrictions.  16 
If anything,  this characterization  of restrictions  on borrowing  under- 
states the importance  of liquidity  constraints  in the real world. In the 
analytical approach we adopt here, only net consumption loans are 
disallowed. Real-world  restrictions  besides the need for collateral  (for 
example,  minimum-income  requirements for  debt  service)  would 
strengthen  our results. Our constraint  does not rule out collateralized 
loans for such durables  as homes or cars.17 Consumption  loans do not 
loom large in U.S. consumer  credit; in 1985,  the volume of household 
borrowing  for unsecured  installment  loans totaled  only $21.9  billion;  for 
new automobile  loans, $37.8 billion;  and  for new home mortgage  loans, 
$152.8 billion.18 Our nonnegativity constraint on net wealth is thus 
broadly  consistent  with this low level of unsecured  borrowing  as well as 
with the empirical  work  discussed above. 
15. For a discussion of information  problems, see Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew 
Weiss, "Credit  Rationing  in Markets  with Imperfect  Information,"  American  Economic 
Review, vol. 71 (June 1981), pp. 393-410; and Charles W. Calomiris  and R. Glenn 
Hubbard,  "Price Flexibility, Credit  Rationing,  and Economic Fluctuations:  Evidence 
from the  U.S.,  1879-1914," Working Paper 1767 (National Bureau of  Economic 
Research,  October  1985). 
16. These distinctions  can be important.  For example,  Hayashi  discusses conditions 
under which excess sensitivity traceable  to liquidity  constraints  from imperfect  infor- 
mation  in the loan market  is not exploitable  by stabilization  policy; see Hayashi, "Tests 
for Liquidity Constraints." The form of  borrowing restrictions we  stress will be 
exploitable.  Note that what is important  is not so much that current  resources  are low 
absolutely but that they are low relative to lifetime resources. Some households may 
be liquidity  constrained,  in the sense of being unable to finance  desired consumption, 
because of anticipated  bequests. For a discussion of this point, see Blinder, "Inter- 
generational  Transfers";  and Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 
17. Even for collateralized  loans, large  spreads  between  borrowing  and lending  rates 
exist. According  to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the average interest rate on twenty- 
four-month  personal  loans in 1982, 1983,  and 1984  was 18.65, 16.50,  and 16.47  percent, 
respectively, while the yield on two-year U.S. Treasury  notes over the same period 
was 12.80, 10.21, and 11.65  percent, respectively. 
18.  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  May  i986,  tables A40 and A42. R. Glenn Huibbard  and Kenneth L. Judd  7 
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The impact of liquidity constraints on consumption  is most easily 
illustrated in a  simple life-cycle model, in which individuals make 
consumption  and  saving  decisions  over  a known  lifetime.19  In  such  an 
unconstrained  model,  consumption  typically  exceeds  earnings  in youth, 
while earnings  exceed consumption  in middle age and then decline in 
retirement,  as illustrated  by the solid  lines in figure  1. The corresponding 
wealth-age  profile  is illustrated  by the solid line in figure  2, where net 
worth  is zero at death. 
In the presence  of a nonnegativity  constraint  on net worth, however, 
consumption  cannot  exceed current  resources in any period. As shown 
in the dotted  line in figure  1  , consumption  tracks  earnings  during  youth, 
when the constraint  is binding, then increases relative to the perfect- 
capital-markets  profile thereafter.  This pattern  is also reflected in the 
individual  wealth-age  profile  in figure  2. Lifetime  utility  from consump- 
19. We take up the issue of uncertainty  over life expectancy with qualitatively 
similar  results in an earlier  paper. Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 8  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Figure 2.  Net Worth over the Life Cycle 
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tion is reduced  by the constraint,  with the magnitude  of the reduction 
increasing the flatter is the desired consumption profile (or for an 
isoelastic utility function, the lower is the intertemporal  elasticity of 
substitution  in consumption).  To the extent that  desired  consumption  is 
even more age-related-increasing, for example, in middle  age as chil- 
dren  are  being  reared-the same  intuition  applies.  The constraint  will be 
less binding  in youth, more binding  in middle age.20  Tax policies that 
depress consumers' net earnings  during  their constrained  periods will 
depress  consumption  dollar  for dollar. 
20. For more  detailed  analyses, see James  Tobin, "Life Cycle Saving  and Balanced 
Growth,"  in William J. Fellner and others,  eds.,  Ten Economic  Studies in the Tradition 
of Irving  Fisher (John  Wiley and Sons, 1967),  pp. 231-56; Tobin and Dolde, "Wealth, 
Liquidity  and  Consumption";  William  C. Brainard,  "Private  and  Social Risk and  Return 
to  Education,"  in Keith  G.  Lumsden,  Efficiency  in  Universities:  The La  Paz  Papers 
(Amsterdam:  Elsevier Scientific  Publishing  Co., 1974),  pp. 241-65. R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  9 
Many  households  are  likely  to experience  binding  liquidity  constraints 
ofthis type.2'  In 1983  a significantfraction  of a sample  of U.S. households 
held financial assets insufficient to insulate consumption from even 
modest  declines in earnings  in the presence of restrictions  on borrowing 
against  future  earnings.  For example,  median  holdings  of financial  assets 
in the sample were only  $3,500.22  As table  1 shows,  both low-income 
and young households had especially low levels of financial  assets. A 
nontrivial  portion  of households  whose head  was under  thirty-five  years 
of age or who earned  less than $15,000 a year held no financial  assets 
whatsoever.  Moreover,  because financial  assets in the table are defined 
to include  Individual  Retirement  Account  and  Keogh  balances,  the totals 
overstate  funds  easily available  to finance  consumption. 
We do not take into account the ability of liquidity-constrained 
consumers  to borrow  against  net nonfinancial  assets such as equity in 
homes, partly  because large-scale  tapping  of housing equity to finance 
consumption  arose only recently and in response to capital gains on 
housing  during  the 1970s.  In any event, as indicated  in table  2, net worth, 
including  home equity, is quite  low for young  households,  most of which 
do not own homes. 
We also ignore the possibility of substantial  inter vivos gifts from 
parents to young adults to relax liquidity constraints. To affect our 
results materially, such gifts would have to include not only such 
"investments" as college tuition payments, but also contributions  to 
income  during  periods  of low earnings.  Moreover,  the provision  of inter 
vivos gifts to children may exacerbate liquidity constraints on the 
parents'  consumption,  a point discussed in more  detail  later. 
Consistent  with  these observations,  the source  of liquidity  constraints 
modeled  here  is the excess of desired  consumption  over current  earnings 
for young,  low-income  households.23 Even if future  earnings  are  certain, 
21. For a discussion of the relevance of the existence of a sufficient  number  of 
households with "too little" net worth for estimating saving equations with cross- 
sectional  data, see M. A. King and L.-D. L. Dicks-Mireaux,  "Asset Holdings  and the 
Life Cycle," Economic  Journal, vol. 92 (June 1982),  pp. 247-67; R. Glenn Hubbard, 
"Do IRAs and Keoghs Increase  Saving?"  National Tax  Journal,  vol. 37 (March  1984), 
pp. 43-54; and  Hubbard,  "Pension  Wealth  and  Individual  Saving:  Some  New Evidence," 
Journal of Money,  Credit, and Banking,  vol.  18, forthcoming. 
22.  "Survey  of  Consumer  Finances,  1983,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol.  70 
(September  1984),  table 10, p. 686. 
23. See also Hayashi, "The Effect of Liquidity  Constraints." 10  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1986 
Table 1.  Financial Assets of Households, by Income and Age of Head of Household, 
1983  a 
Dollars unless otherwise  specified 
Total  financial 
Liquid  assets  assets 
Percent  owning 
Item  financial assets  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Household  income 
Lessthan5,000  57  2,177  500  3,254  513 
5,000-7,499  70  3,663  1,000  4,296  1,000 
7,500-9,999  75  5,378  800  6,114  848 
10,000-14,999  87  9,549  1,719  11,619  2,205 
15,000-19,999  93  9,130  1,513  12,021  1,780 
20,000-24,999  95  11,365  2,105  14,078  2,385 
25,000-29,999  97  12,509  2,798  18,539  3,349 
30,000-39,999  99  17,783  4,717  22,752  5,950 
40,000-49,999  99  16,285  7,828  32,342  10,631 
50,000  or more  99  45,541  19,886  125,131  31,658 
Age of head of household 
Under 25  81  1,972  600  2,646  746 
25-34  87  4,274  1,203  7,963  1,514 
35-44  91  8,911  3,000  14,414  3,750 
45-54  89  14,826  3,308  23,009  4,131 
55-64  91  25,439  7,425  54,951  9,338 
65-74  88  30,666  9,676  65,339  11,400 
75 and over  86  26,481  7,885  37,060  10,350 
Source:  "Survey  of Consumer Finances,  1983," Federal Reserve  Builletin, vol.  70 (September  1984), p. 686, table 
10. 
a.  Liquid assets  include checking  and savings  accounts,  money-market  funds,  IRA and Keogh  balances,  savings 
bonds,  and certificates  of deposit.  Financial assets  include liquid assets  and holdings of stocks,  bonds,  and trusts. 
the presence of borrowing  restrictions  in youth  will cause the consump- 
tion profile to differ from its no-restrictions  counterpart. Uncertain 
streams  of earnings  can also lead to liquidity  constraints  with a nonneg- 
ativity constraint on resources available for current consumption.24 
Adding  this complexity  would not alter our qualitative  results; indeed, 
it would strengthen  the importance  of liquidity  constraints  in accounting 
for national  saving.25 
24. Robert  Barsky,  Gregory  Mankiw,  and Stephen  Zeldes analyze  the nonneutrality 
of temporary  tax cuts in this  case. Hal  Varian  discusses  the issue in terms  of redistributive 
tax policy as social insurance.  Robert  B. Barsky, N. Gregory  Mankiw,  and Stephen  P. 
Zeldes, "Ricardian  Consumers with Keynesian Propensities," Working  Paper 1400 
(National Bureau  of Economic Research, July 1984);  Hal R. Varian, "Redistributive 
Taxation  as Social Insurance,"  Journal of Public Economics, vol. 14 (August 1980), 
pp. 49-68. 
25. In an econometric  analysis, Jonathan  Skinner  does not find a significant  effect R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  11 
Table 2.  Homeownership and Total Net Worth of Households, by Age of Head 
of Household, 1983 
Dollars  unless otherwise  specified 
Age of head  Median  total  Percent owning 
of household  net worth  homea 
Under  25  5  n.a. 
Under 35  n.a.  34 
25-34  3,654  n.a. 
35-44  28,721  66 
45-54  43,797  75 
55-64  55,587  73 
65-74  50,181  n.a. 
65 and over  n.a.  70 
75 and over  35,939  n.a. 
Sources:  Information on median total net worth is from "Survey of Consumer Finances,  1983: A Second  Report," 
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol.  70 (December  1984), p.  863,  table 7.  Information on  percent  owning  home  is from 
"Survey  of Consumer Finances,  1983," Federal Reserve  Bulletin,  vol.  70 (September  1984), p. 683, table 5. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Homeownership  information  is  reported  for  ages  35 and  under and 65  and  over,  rather than for  the  more 
disaggregated categories. 
Liquidity  Constraints  and  Consumption  in  the  Life-Cycle  Model 
Most  questions  of  fiscal  policy  or  tax  reform  are  best  suited  to 
multiperiod  models  that  consider  long-run  effects  of reforms,  either  for 
individuals  or  for  the  economy.  Even  two-period  models  can  deliver 
surprising  results  about  the effect  of tax policy  changes  on such  variables 
as saving.26 
THE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL AND TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 
It is not  surprising  that the life-cycle  model  of consumption  has  been 
the  workhorse  of  many  analyses  of  the  effects  of  tax  changes  on 
consumption  and  welfare.27  The  model  provides  a realistic  number  of 
periods  in  an  individual's  life  to  permit  consideration  of  the  effect  of 
of "earnings  uncertainty"  on individual  saving. We discuss this point again in the 
context of our simulation  exercises. Jonathan  Skinner,  "Risky Income and Life Cycle 
Consumption"  (University  of Virginia,  July 1985). 
26. See Martin  Feldstein, "The Welfare  Cost of Capital  Income  Taxation,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 86 (April 1978,  part  2), pp. S29-S51. 
27. For a description  of the model, see Franco Modigliani  and Richard  Brumberg, 
"Utility Analysis and the Consumption  Function:  An Interpretation  of Cross-Section 
Data," in Kenneth K. Kurihara,  ed., Post-Keynesian  Economics (Rutgers  University 12  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
even temporary  policy changes  on lifetime  consumption  and  welfare. It 
is extremely valuable  as an analytical  tool because it does not rely on 
ad hoc rules  of behavior  and  is consistent  with  basic demand  and supply 
theory  and  rational  expectations  methodology.  The  life-cycle  framework 
has  been used in  the construction  of dynamic  general  equilibrium  models 
that  permit  comparison  of steady states of different  policy regimes.28 
While the life-cycle model provides a theoretically consistent and 
logical framework  for an examination of policy-induced changes in 
consumption,  it is not without  its critics. At the theoretical  level, it has 
been argued  that  the model  requires  consumers  to be both "not forward- 
looking  enough" and "too forward-looking."  In one case, critics  assert 
that consumers  are much  more myopic than  the life-cycle model would 
allow, that they might  be guided,  for example, by rule-of-thumb  saving 
behavior.29  It is not obvious what effect tax policy would have in such a 
world. In the alternative case, most closely associated with Robert 
Barro,  critics argue  that if consumers  consider  their  heirs when making 
their  own consumption  decisions, the relevant  optimizing  horizon  may 
be infinite,  and  the capital  stock would not arise  out of a mismatching  of 
earnings  and  desired  consumption  over individuals'  lives.30 
The life-cycle model's  predictions  have also been criticized  in empir- 
ical studies. For example, some studies  of wealth  profiles  over time find 
a significant  number  of individuals  or  households  with  "too  little  wealth."'31 
Press, 1954),  pp. 388-436; and Albert  Ando and Franco  Modigliani,  "The 'Life Cycle' 
Hypothesis  of Saving:  Aggregate  Implications  and  Tests," American  Economic  Review, 
vol. 53 (March 1963), pp. 55-84. For a survey of applications  to fiscal policy issues, 
see Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  "Taxation  and  Savings:  A Neoclassical  Perspective,"  Journal 
of Economic  Literature,  vol.  22 (December  1984), pp.  1576-1629. 
28. See Summers, "Capital  Taxation"; Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner, "The 
Efficiency  Gains";  and Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 
29. Richard  H. Thaler  and H. M. Shefrin,  "An Economic  Theory  of Self-Control," 
Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  89 (April 1981), pp. 392-406. 
30. Robert  J. Barro, "Are Government  Bonds Net Wealth?"  Journal of Political 
Economy, vol.  82 (November-December  1974), pp.  1095-1117. For an interesting 
comparison  of predictions of life-cycle and infinite-horizon  models, see  Michael J. 
Boskin and Laurence  J. Kotlikoff, "Public  Debt and U.S. Saving:  A New Test of the 
Neutrality  Hypothesis," Working  Paper 1646  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
June 1985). 
31. See the study  for Canada  by King  and Dicks-Mireaux,  and for the United States 
by Hubbard.  King  and  Dicks-Mireaux,  "Asset Holdings";  Hubbard,  "Do IRAs Increase 
Saving?" R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  13 
In addition, econometric studies typically find lower dissaving rates 
among  the retired  elderly than the theory would predict, though  James 
Davies and  Hubbard  have offered  uncertainty  about  life expectancy  and 
the fear of living too long as plausible  explanations  within  the life-cycle 
framework.32  Perhaps most challenging to applications of the basic 
model is the claim by Laurence  Kotlikoff  and Lawrence  Summers  that 
life-cycle saving  as they define  it can explain  only a small  portion  of the 
capital  stock in the United States, with the clear  implication  that  models 
emphasizing  intergenerational  transfers  as the dominant  factor  in saving 
decisions deserve more  attention.33 
These empirical  questions about the life-cycle model do not neces- 
sarily  refute  the basic insight  of the theory, that consumers  are forward 
looking in their behavior and optimize over a long (lifetime)  horizon. 
Here we maintain  that insight  and focus on the implications  of liquidity 
constraints  for analyses of the impact  of tax changes or tax reform  on 
national  saving and individual  welfare. The specification  of a lifetime 
budget constraint in standard  uses of the life-cycle model is not an 
accurate  representation  of restrictions  on consumption  smoothing  when 
capital  markets  are characterized  by collateral  restrictions,  differences 
in borrowing  and lending  rates, and credit rationing.  The central issue 
within the life-cycle framework  is as follows. Hump-shaped  lifetime 
earnings  profiles  rising  toward  middle  age then  leveling  off and  declining 
in old age imply that individuals  will want to consume more than their 
current  resources allow when young.34  They cannot do so if liquidity 
constraints  are binding. 
32. For studies of dissaving  among  the elderly, see Thad W. Mirer, "The Wealth- 
Age Relation  among  the Aged," American  Economic  Review, vol. 69 (June 1979),  pp. 
435-43; King  and  Dicks-Mireaux,  "Asset Holdings";  and Hubbard,  "Pension  Wealth." 
For explanations  of the low dissaving  rate, see James B. Davies, "Uncertain  Lifetime, 
Consumption,  and Dissaving in Retirement,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89 
(June 1981), pp. 561-77; and R. Glenn Hubbard,  " 'Precautionary'  Saving Revisited: 
Social  Security,  Individual  Welfare  and  the Capital  Stock," Working  Paper  1430  (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August 1984). 
33. Laurence  J. Kotlikoff  and  Lawrence  H. Summers,  "The  Role  of Intergenerational 
Transfers  in Aggregate  Capital  Accumulation,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 89 
(August 1981),  pp. 706-32. The potential  role of precautionary  saving  in accounting  for 
this discrepancy  is emphasized  by Hubbard  and Judd  in "Social Security." 
34. See Davies, "Uncertain  Lifetime"; and Finis Welch, "Effects of Cohort Size 
on Earnings:  The Baby Boom Babies' Financial  Bust," Journal  of Political Economy, 
vol. 87 (October  1979,  part  2), pp. S65-S97. 14  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
SIMULATING  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  LIQUIDITY  CONSTRAINTS 
To  simulate the effects of  alternative tax and fiscal policies on 
consumption,  we make use of a life-cycle model in which no bequests 
are  desired  and  individuals  consume so as to maximize  an intertemporal 
utility function subject  to a lifetime budget  constraint.  Individuals  live 
for T years, working  only for the first  R years; the retirement  age of R is 
taken  as exogenous, and, for the moment,  assume that  labor  is supplied 
inelastically.  (We  use a model  with  elastic  labor  supply  in all simulations; 
see the discussion of the full model in appendix  A.) Model simulations 
begin at the commencement  of individuals'  working  lives, assumed to 
be age twenty. Retirement  occurs after forty-five  years of work; death 
occurs ten years later. 
The addition  of substantial  bequests would complicate  the model.35 
Bequests can be either  planned  or "accidental."  The latter  occur when 
individuals  who have saved to insure against  long life die prematurely 
and  with  positive  wealth.  In  the context  of accidental  bequests  generated 
by precautionary  saving, the effects of liquidity constraints remain 
important.36  In fact, because many  liquidity-constrained  individuals  are 
effectively constrained  only early in life, to the extent that accidental 
bequests are received relatively late in life, our conclusions about the 
importance of  liquidity constraints are strengthened, since desired 
consumption  in youth would be further  increased relative to current 
resources. 
Nor would planned bequests seriously weaken our analysis. If an 
individual  plans to leave a bequest to his child, his desired lifetime 
consumption  is reduced.  However, if he himself  receives a bequest  from 
a parent,  that bequest could be used to finance  his bequest to his child. 
As long as the bequest he receives from his parent arrives after his 
constrained  periods  and  he plans  on leaving  a comparably  sized bequest 
35. Michael  Hurd  finds  essentially  no bequest  motive evident  in the saving  behavior 
of households  in the Retirement  History Survey, concluding  that bequests are much 
more  likely  to be of the "accidental"  variety  attributable  to lifetime  uncertainty.  Michael 
D. Hurd, "Savings  and Bequests," Working  Paper 1826  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  January  1986). 
36. See the analysis of liquidity  constraints  and precautionary  saving in Hubbard 
and Judd, "Social Security." R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  15 
to his child, a natural  steady-state  assumption,  his consumption  path is 
financed by his earnings, and bequests received and given are not 
important  for  consumption  decisions. Therefore,  ignoring  bequests  does 
not seriously reduce the plausibility  of our analysis for the issues we 
examine  below. 
Assuming  that utility is additively  separable  across periods, individ- 
uals maximize 
T 
(1)  f  U(c)e-P  dt, 
subject  to 
(2)  A  =  (1 -  TL)  E +  (1  -  TK)  rA -  c,  A(O) = A(T)  = 0, 
where c,  p, and r represent consumption, the (constant) subjective 
discount  rate, and  the interest  rate, respectively.  The coefficients  TL and 
TK denote tax rates on labor  and capital  income, respectively;  A repre- 
sents the stock of accumulated  assets. A dot over a variable  denotes a 
time  rate  of change. The income stream,  E, represents  labor  earnings. 
For simplicity,  assuming  that the utility function is of the isoelastic 
form, we can rewrite  equation  1 as 
(3)  maxf  11  c  I  -  V'e-Ptdt, 
where P measures the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in con- 
sumption. 
If X  denotes the marginal  utility  of consumption  and c(A)  is defined  as 
consumption  corresponding  to X, the differential  equations describing 
the time paths  of consumption  and  wealth  accumulation  are given by 
(4a)  A =  [p -(1-TK)-r], 
and 
(4b)  A  =  (1-  TK)rA +  (1  -  TL)E -c(), 
together with the boundary conditions A(O) = A(T)  =  0. 
In the absence of borrowing  restrictions,  the capital stock will be a 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
function of underlying  parameter  values, the age distribution  of the 
population,  and the shapes of individual  earnings  profiles. In the basic 
life-cycle model, individual  savings profiles are expected to be hump- 
shaped,  with  borrowing  by young  people, substantial  asset accumulation 
by those in middle age, and dissaving by the elderly. Within this 
framework,  "tax reforms,  " either  changes  in  tax rates  or shifts  in  relative 
reliance  on different  tax bases, have real effects only to the extent that 
they alter  steady-state  factor  prices. 
These results will be qualified  in the presence of borrowing  restric- 
tions. It is here that  the choice of pretax  earnings  profiles  for simulation 
exercises is particularly  relevant.  We chose the profile  used by Davies.37 
By using  an average  earnings  profile,  we are ignoring  individual-specific 
fluctuations  in earnings.  Since the marginal  loss due to a tighter  liquidity 
constraint  is negligible  if the constraint  is slack and greater  when the 
constraint  is binding,  losses due to the liquidity  constraint  are convex in 
the tightness  of the constraint.  Using  the average  earnings  pattern  means 
that  losses are  underestimated,  since  the distribution  of earnings  patterns 
would include  some with much  tighter  constraints  as well as some with 
looser constraints. 
When  we impose the constraint  that net worth must be nonnegative 
at all times, we  substantially  change the nature of the consumer's 
optimization  problem.  The budget  constraint  in equation  2 becomes 
(5)  A =  (1 -  TL)E  +  (1 -  TK)  rA -  c,  A(t)  O. 
The first-order  conditions  must  be altered  to take into account  this state 
constraint.38  The new arbitrage  conditions  become 
(4a')  A =  [p -  (1  -  TK)r]  X,  if A > O or X >  U' [(1 -  TL)E], 
X =  U' [(1 -  TL)E], if A = O  and A ,  U' [(1  TL)E], 
where X  is continuous.  Assets obey 
37. Davies, "Uncertain  Lifetime." That is, as in Davies (p. 572), the lifetime path 
of mean noninvestment  income E is approximated  by a fourth-order  polynomial: 
E(t)  =  -36,999.4  +  3520.22t -  101.878t2 +  1.34816t3 -  0.00706233t4. 
38. For a discussion of  such problems, see  Morton I.  Kamien and Nancy L. 
Schwartz,  Dynamic  Optimization:  The Calculus  of  Variations  and Optimal Control in 
Economics  and Management  (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1982). R. Glenn  Hubbard  and Kenneth  L. Judd  17 
(4b')  A = 0,  ifA  =  0andX  k  U' [(1  -  TL)EL, 
A  =  (1 -  TK)rA +  (1  -  TL)E  -  c(A) otherwise. 
If assets are  positive  or  if earnings  exceed consumption,  then  equation 
2 still holds. Otherwise,  consumption  is limited  to current  earnings,  and 
the consumer's optimization  problem  is divided into constrained  and 
unconstrained  intervals;  equation  4b' governs  how these intervals  meet. 
At the point when A  :  0 becomes binding, it imposes the necessary 
tangency  relation  between A and the constraint.  The reason is that if A 
is falling  when the liquidity  constraint  begins  to bind, consumption  must 
fall discontinuously,  an unlikely  event, since the consumer  could have 
smoothed  consumption  by slowing  the decumulation. 
Aggregate  consumption  is determined  in the model  by summing  over 
the individual consumption of those alive at a given time. That is, 
consumption  of individuals  at each age is determined,  with the relative 
number  of individuals  at each age depending  on the rate of growth of 
population.  Aggregate  asset stocks are constructed  similarly.  To obtain 
estimates of the importance of liquidity constraints for steady-state 
measures  of the aggregate  capital stock, we initially  allow for variable 
factor  prices. We assume that output  is produced  according  to a Cobb- 
Douglas production  function in capital and labor, with a capital share 
equal  to cx.  Factor  markets  are  assumed  to be competitive,  so that  capital 
and labor are paid their marginal  products. That is, the gross interest 
rate, r, and  base wage rate, w, satisfy 
(6)  r  a-k-  and 
(7)  w  =  (1 -  )ka, 
where  k represents  the capital-labor  ratio. 
Within  this framework,  the steady state can be solved as follows. A 
guess is made for k. Solutions for r and w are then generated  from the 
marginal  productivity  conditions  to produce  individual  consumption  and 
wealth  profiles.  The resulting  aggregate  consumption  and capital  stock 
are compared  with  the initial  guess, and  iteration  proceeds  until  conver- 
gence is reached. 
In table  3, we present  findings  on the effects of borrowing  restrictions 
on the capital  stock and individual  welfare  when o- = 0.3. The discount 
rate  was chosen to be 1.5 percent, and  population  growth  was assumed 18  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1986 
Table 3.  Importance of Liquidity Constraints for Steady-State Values of National 
Savinga 
Elasticity  of  Capital-income  ratio  Percent  of 
substitution  income  held 
in  Number  of  Percent  of  by 
consumption  Uncon-  periods  population  constrained 
(O)b  strained  Constrained  constrained  constrained  consumers 
1.10  4.40  4.43  4  7.3  2.7 
0.50  2.79  3.26  6  12.0  5.5 
0.25  1.64  2.21  9  19.0  10.8 
0.20  1.08  1.66  9  19.0  10.8 
0.10  0.68  1.27  1  1  23.5  14.9 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  The model assumes  a general proportional tax on both capital,  TK,  and labor,  TL,  income  of 0.3. 
b.  See  equation 3. 
to be 1 percent a year; the interest rate is determined  endogenously.39 
The model outlined before was simulated in the case of a general 
proportional  income tax of 30 percent for five values of 3 (1.10, 0.50, 
0.25, 0.20, and  0. 10).40 Results  are  presented  for the capital-income  ratio 
in the absence and  presence of the wealth-nonnegativity  constraint,  the 
number of  periods for which the consumption is  constrained, the 
percentage  of the population  constrained,  and  the percentage  of income 
39. Results were robust to minor  variations  in the rate of time preference.  We felt 
that p  =  0.015 was a reasonable choice, and the selection of a low discount rate 
furnishes  a lower-bound  estimate of the effects of liquidity  constraints  on consumption 
and welfare,  since a higher  rate  would  only have increased  desired  consumption  relative 
to current  resources. 
40. There is some evidence in the literature  on the value of P. In their study of 
household  portfolio  allocation,  Irwin Friend  and Marshall  Blume  estimate P to be less 
than 0.5.  Henry Farber's estimation of preferences of  United Mine Workers from 
collective bargaining  agreements  yields results consistent with a P of about 0.3. Lars 
Peter  Hansen  and  Kenneth  Singleton  find  implied  estimates  of P  of at least 0.5. Lawrence 
Summers  reports  estimates of intertemporal  elasticities of about unity using quarterly 
postwar data. Robert Hall concludes from a  set of results that the value for the 
intertemporal  elasticity is roughly zero. We chose a set of values of P to span these 
various  estimates. See Irwin Friend  and Marshall  E. Blume, "The Demand  for Risky 
Assets,"  American Economic  Review,  vol.  65 (December  1975), pp. 900-22;  Henry S. 
Farber,  "Individual  Preferences  and  Union  Wage  Determination:  The Case of the United 
Mine Workers,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 86 (October 1978), pp. 923-42; 
Lars Peter  Hansen  and  Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "Stochastic  Consumption,  Risk  Aversion, 
and the Temporal  Behavior  of Asset Returns,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 91 
(April 1983),  pp. 249-65; Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Tax Policy, the Rate of Return,  and 
Savings," Working  Paper 995 (National Bureau of Economic Research, September 
1982);  Robert  E. Hall, "Real Interest  and  Consumption,"  Working  Paper  1694  (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August 1985). R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  19 
earned by individuals whose consumption is limited by current re- 
sources. 
As expected, as the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in con- 
sumption  declines, reflected in lower values of f3, the capital-income 
ratio rises in the constrained  case relative to the unconstrained  case. 
This effect of forced saving  through  liquidity  constraints  is also evident 
in the corresponding  increase  in the number  of periods  constrained,  the 
percentage  of the population  constrained, and the fraction of income 
earned  by constrained  consumers.4'  Note, for example, that  in the case 
wherein  ,3 = 0.25, the constrained  capital  stock is 35 percent  larger  than 
the unconstrained  capital  stock, with borrowing  constraints  binding  on 
19  percent  of the population  receiving 11  percent  of disposable  income. 
These results suggest that tax policies that exacerbate the severity or 
duration  of liquidity  constraints  are likely to lead to substantial  welfare 
costs, especially when the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in 
consumption  is small. 
The simulations in table 3 aggregate individual consumption and 
savings decisions. To check the robustness of  our findings of  the 
importance  of liquidity  constraints  in the aggregate,  we also consider 
the effects of changes in family size over the life cycle.  This is a 
consideration  that  may be important,  since individuals  may desire more 
consumption  in middle  age to finance  expenses of rearing  and  educating 
children.  This could reduce  both desired consumption  in youth and the 
impact  of any nonnegativity  constraint  on wealth. The individual  utility 
function  in equation  1  is modified  to 
T 
(1')  fn(t)  U(c)e-Pt  dt, 
where ct represents  consumption  per capita in the household at time t 
and  nt  represents  the number  of adult  equivalents  in the family  at time t, 
where  children  receive less than  the weight  of adults  in calculating  family 
size. 
In our simulations,  we consider both the individual  case described 
above and a family case. In the family case we use a study by Walter 
Dolde for values to assign  to the weights  for family  members  of different 
41. Our predictions for the fraction of  aggregate disposable income earned by 
constrained  individuals  are lower than Hayashi's  point estimate  of 17.1 percent, but, as 
noted before, our description  of borrowing  restrictions  is most likely an underestimate 
of their  severity  in the real world. See Hayashi, "The Permanent  Income  Hypothesis." 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
ages and  for a time  path  of household  income.42  The results  in table  3 are 
robust  to this modification.  In particular,  liquidity  constraints  are often 
more  binding  and  last longer.  Individuals  do not want  to borrow  as much 
in youth, but do want to borrow  more and for a longer  period in early 
years of family life, since peak family size (in adult equivalents) is 
achieved  before  peak  family  earnings.  In the interest  of space, we do not 
report  these modifications  here, but do include  the results  for the family 
in the important  tax policy simulations  below. 
In summary,  the simulations  show that  a nonnegativity  constraint  for 
personal  wealth  has a substantial  effect on the long-run  supply  of capital. 
The potential welfare costs  associated with the effects of liquidity 
constraints  on consumption  do not, of course, imply  that society should 
make  large  transfers  to young, constrained  workers.43  Constraints  with 
respect  to incentive  effects and social convention  abound.  The marginal 
contribution  of taxation  to those welfare  costs is, however, a legitimate 
concern  of public  policy within  the context of optimal  taxation. 
Liquidity Constraints  and Tax Policy Evaluation 
Life-cycle simulation  models have been used extensively in the area 
of tax reform-in particular,  to measure  the welfare  effects of switching 
from a general  income tax on both capital  and labor  income to a tax on 
labor  income alone and  from  a progressive  income tax to a proportional 
income tax.44  According  to the findings  of recent studies, the first-order 
42. Dolde, "Capital  Markets."  See also Brainard,  "Private  and Social Risk." In an 
econometric  study, Thomas  MaCurdy  finds  little evidence that children  affect life-cycle 
consumption.  See Thomas  E. MaCurdy,  "A Simple  Scheme  for Estimating  an Intertem- 
poral Model of Labor Supply and Consumption  in the Presence of Taxes and Uncer- 
tainty,"  International  Economic  Review,  vol.  24 (June 1983), pp. 265-89. 
43. Policymakers  have, however,  considered  such reforms  in the context of negative 
income tax programs  or demogrants. 
44. For discussions of capital and labor income taxation, see Summers, "Capital 
Taxation";  Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and Skinner,  "The Efficiency  Gains";  Owen  J. Evans, 
"Tax Policy, the Interest Elasticity of Saving, and Capital  Accumulation:  Numerical 
Analysis  of Theoretical  Models," American  Economic  Review, vol. 73 (June 1983),  pp. 
398-410; Laurence  S. Seidman,  "Conversion  to a Consumption  Tax: The Transition  in 
a Life-Cycle Growth  Model," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 92 (April 1984),  pp. 
247-67. For a discussion of progressive  and proportional  taxation, see Auerbach  and 
Kotlikoff, "National Savings"; Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner, "The Efficiency 
Gains." R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  21 
welfare  effects of either  shift  can be quite  large.45 
Many  recent studies  have focused on intertemporal  distortion  arising 
from the taxation of capital income. The issues involved in switching 
from  general  income  taxation-a  tax on both capital  and  labor  income- 
toward taxation of labor income alone can be summarized  in a simple 
two-period  model  of consumption  and  labor  income. When  labor  income 
is exogenous, a general  income tax is equivalent  to a combination  of a 
lump-sum  tax and  a tax on interest  income. Since the tax reduces  the net 
rate  of interest,  the system  discourages  saving  and  discriminates  in  favor 
of present  consumption  at the expense of future  consumption. 
Because substitution  effects diminish  for consumers  for whom  liquid- 
ity constraints  are binding  or expected to bind, the potential  efficiency 
gains from policy reform are reduced according  to the importance  of 
liquidity-constrained  consumers  in the population.  Any increase  in labor 
income taxes to compensate for lost capital income taxes crowds out 
first-period  consumption  dollar  for dollar  for such individuals  in a two- 
period  world  with a binding  liquidity  constraint  in the first  period. 
In a comparison  of capital  and  labor  taxation  in the context of a two- 
period model, Martin  Feldstein finds significant  efficiency gains from 
moving  from  a proportional  general  income tax to a proportional  tax on 
labor  income.46  The partial  equilibrium  character  of Feldstein's  analysis 
and  the single  period  of labor  supply  are, however, important  qualifica- 
tions of his results.47 
Lawrence  Summers  shows that  the efficiency  costs of capital  income 
taxation analyzed in a realistic life-cycle model are likely to be much 
larger  than  those suggested  in two-period  models.48  The channel  for this 
effect is intuitive. A cut in the capital income tax rate raises the net 
return  to saving, and the substitution  effect discourages  consumption; 
for  individuals  in debt, the  income  effect further  depresses  consumption. 
The resulting  decline in consumption  can lead to a substantial  increase 
in lifetime  saving.  Indeed,  for the case of an  additively  separable  lifetime 
45. See, for example, Summers,  "Capital  Taxation." 
46. Feldstein, "The Welfare  Cost." 
47. For a criticism of Feldstein's approximations  of loss measures, see Jerry R. 
Green and Eytan Sheshinski, "Approximating  the Efficiency Gain of Tax Reforms," 
Journal of Public Economics,  vol.  11 (April 1979), pp.  179-95. 
48. Summers,  "Capital  Taxation." See also the qualifications  of Summers's  results 
in Evans, "Tax Policy," and Seidman, "Conversion  to a Consumption  Tax." 22  Brookings Papers ont  Economic Activity, 1:1986 
utility  function  with (approximately)  logarithmic  utility over consump- 
tion and  inelastically  supplied  labor,  Summers  finds  an efficiency  gain  of 
almost 12 percent of lifetime income from switching from a general 
income tax to a consumption  tax. 
The assumption  of inelastically  supplied  labor is not realistic. Also, 
the marginal  welfare cost of factor taxation is the important  index of 
distortion for our purposes. Assuming elastically supplied labor and 
capital,  in a perfect  foresight  model of general  equilibrium,  Judd  shows 
that the marginal  welfare cost of taxing both labor and capital  income 
taxation  is even greater  than  the welfare  cost found  by Summers,  ranging 
from twenty-five cents to a dollar per marginal  dollar of revenue for 
central estimates of the critical structural  parameters.49  This is the 
critical cost of introducing  progressivity  into the tax structure, since 
progressivity  is largely an increase in taxation with the extra revenue 
financing  a lump-sum  transfer. In order for the result to be welfare- 
improving,  the benefits  of the progressivity  must  exceed the substantial 
marginal  efficiency  costs of factor  taxation  that arise in our model. 
Arguments  against  progressive  income taxation  focus on distortions 
in intertemporal  consumption  decisions and in labor-supply  decisions. 
Using a dynamic  life-cycle simulation  model  with a labor-leisure  choice 
in addition to intertemporal  consumption  decisions, Alan Auerbach, 
Laurence Kotlikoff, and Jonathan  Skinner find substantial  efficiency 
costs to using  a progressive  income  tax  rather  than  a proportional  income 
tax in financing  a given level of government  spending.50 
When liquidity  constraints  are introduced,  important  new elements 
enter  the analysis. Consider  for example  a simple  linear  (but  nonpropor- 
tional) tax with intercept - w and marginal  tax rate t; the system is 
progressive  or regressive  according  to whether  w is greater  or less than 
zero. With  perfect  capital  markets,  an increase  in the lump-sum  transfer 
to an individual  financed  by higher  tax rates on labor  and  capital  income 
will  distort  both  working  and  saving  decisions, the magnitudes  depending 
on underlying  parameter  values. Declines in capital  accumulation  from 
reduced  saving  rates  and  work  effort  lowerboth  consumption  and  lifetime 
utility of representative  consumers in the new steady state. When net 
49. Kenneth  L. Judd, "The Welfare  Cost of Factor  Taxation  in a Perfect  Foresight 
Model,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  forthcoming. 
50. Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and Skinner,  "The Efficiency  Gains." R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  23 
asset positions are required  to be nonnegative,  higher  exemption  levels 
(increases  in income  from  increased  lump  sum  transfers)  raise consump- 
tion dollar  for dollar  for individuals  for whom the constraint  binds. The 
distortions  noted above must  be contrasted  with this utility  gain. 
With  labor supply  assumed elastic, the examination  of the effects of 
borrowing  restrictions  is more  complicated,  but  it is important  to simulate 
such  a case for two reasons. First, consideration  of the efficiency  effects 
of progressive  taxation  or of shifts  in the relative  reliance  on capital  and 
labor  income  taxation  requires  treatment  of behavioral  responses  of both 
labor  and capital. Second, consumers  can ease liquidity  constraints  on 
consumption  by increasing  work  during  constrained  periods, at a cost in 
individual  welfare. 
All these considerations  provide direction  in applying  the life-cycle 
model to realistic parameters  in analyzing  the effects of tax reform  on 
national  saving  and resource  allocation.  The effect of tax reform  on the 
welfare  of liquidity-constrained  consumers  will be important  for assess- 
ing the aggregate  welfare effects of policy changes. Any switch away 
from  capital  income taxation  toward  increased  taxation  of wage income 
will entail, ceteris paribus, an efficiency loss from a decline in the 
consumption  of constrained  consumers, a loss that must be weighed 
against the efficiency gain from lessening tax-induced distortions in 
intertemporal  consumption  decisions. Similarly,  to the extent that  earn- 
ings rise with age over most of the working  life, progressive taxation 
shifts  the individual  lifetime  of taxation  away from  constrained  periods, 
permitting  gains in lifetime consumption  and welfare. Earlier studies 
focus only on the efficiency costs of distortions  in labor supply under 
progressive  taxation.5' 
WELFARE  EFFECTS  OF  CAPITAL  AND  LABOR  INCOME  TAXATION 
As noted by Summers,  capital  taxation  in a life-cycle growth model 
can lead  to substantial  reductions  in individual  welfare  when individuals 
supply  labor  inelastically  throughout  their  working  lives.52  Since reduc- 
tions in the level of capital  taxation  will in general  be financed  by higher 
51. These distortions  can, of course, be large. See, for example, the estimates by 
Jerry A. Hausman  in "Labor Supply," in Henry J. Aaron and Joseph A. Pechman, 
eds., How  Taxes Affect  Economic  Behavior  (Brookings,  1981),  pp. 27-72. 
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taxes on labor  income, to the extent that  labor  is elastically  supplied,  the 
efficiency  effects of policy reform  are  no longer  obvious. However, Judd 
shows that, except in the case of an immediate  and temporary  capital 
income tax, a marginal  substitution  of labor  taxation  for capital  income 
taxation  would be welfare-improving.53  The consensus is that intertem- 
poral distortions induced by  capital income taxation dominate the 
contemporaneous  distortions  due to labor  income  taxation  when capital 
markets  are  assumed  perfect. Our  concern  is with  the complications  that 
borrowing  restrictions  introduce. 
Our first experiment would eliminate the capital income tax and 
finance  the reform  by higher  taxes on labor  income. We take as our  base 
case a proportional  tax on capital  and  labor  income such that  TK  =  FL 
0.3.  As TK  iS set equal to zero, we solve for the labor  tax rate, FL,  that 
raises the same revenue as the proportional  general income tax. We 
assume elastic labor supply, making the individual's lifetime utility 
function described in equation 1 additively separable  in consumption 
and leisure (see the detailed  discussion in appendix  A). The exercise is 
conducted  under  an open-economy  assumption,  where the interest  rate 
remains  at  the same  level as that  prevailing  prior  to the  policy  experiment. 
To allow for a reasonable  range  of the underlying  parameter  values, 
we perform  the experiment  for two values of the interest  rate, 0.04 and 
0.08. While an 8 percent interest rate is unrealistically  high as a repre- 
sentation  of any available  riskless  return,  we include  it here, since risky 
assets have expected returns  in that  range. Since it is not known  how to 
account properly for the riskiness of real-world investments in our 
deterministic  model,  we choose to examine  these two values, bracketing, 
we hope, the true best approximation.  We also examine two values of 
the compensated  wage elasticity of labor supply, 0.1 and 0.5 (see the 
discussion in appendix  A), and four values of 3, 1.1, 0.5, 0.2, and 0.1. 
Results for changes in individual  welfare in unconstrained  and con- 
strained  cases are reported  in table  4. 
53. Judd, "The Welfare  Cost." 
54. Summers  and Feldstein  describe  the U.S. tax system as being characterized  by 
tK  =  0.5 and  TL  =  0.2. That  description  is probably  unrealistic  in the current  environment 
of declining  capital  taxation.  In any event, starting  with a higher  tax on interest  income 
would  accentuate  our  findings  in the constrained  regime.  Summers,  "Capital  Taxation"; 
Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers,  "Inflation  and  the Taxation  of Capital  Income 
in the Corporate  Sector," National Tax  Journal,  vol. 32 (December  1979),  pp. 445-70. 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
For each combination  of labor supply elasticity and capital market 
specification,  we report  the efficiency gain for both the "single" case 
and  the "family"  case. The single  case should  not be interpreted  literally 
as a single individual,  but as one in which the family size does not vary 
much  over time or has relatively  little impact  on consumption  demand. 
These two cases cover a wide range  of beliefs concerning  the impact  of 
family experience on intertemporal  demand (see  appendix A)  and 
indicate the sensitivity of our analysis to such factors. In all cases, 
efficiency  gains are expressed as a percentage  of lifetime  taxes paid."5 
As expected, in the unconstrained  case, substantial  efficiency gains 
are  achieved  by moving  from  capital  to labor  income  taxation.  Gains  are 
largest  for high values of the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in 
consumption,  where  the sensitivity  of saving  to changes  in the net return 
is substantial.  These gains  are mitigated  substantially  in the constrained 
case. As the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  in consumption 
assumes smaller  values in the constrained  case, the effect of the borrow- 
ing restrictions  becomes more significant,  and the switch from capital 
income to labor  income taxation  leads to much smaller  gains than  in the 
unconstrained  case and even, in some cases,  to welfare costs.  For 
example, from table 4, when r  =  0.04, f3 =  0.2, and q =  0.1, a 0.6 
percent  gain  from  eliminating  capital  taxation  when capital  markets  are 
perfect  becomes a 2.0 percent  loss with liquidity  constraints. 
Nor does the pattern of gains and losses in the family case differ 
qualitatively  from that in the single case. The family-size elements 
moderate  the gains and losses, but even these quantitative  differences 
are  not large.  In both  cases, the addition  of liquidity  constraints  substan- 
tially  affects  and  often  reverses  the efficiency  gains  that  would  otherwise 
arise. 
RECONSIDERING  THE  COSTS  OF  PROGRESSIVE  INCOME 
TAXATION 
Debates over the effects of progressive income taxation on work 
effort  and  saving  have figured  prominently  in the policy agenda  in recent 
years. In particular,  estimates  of significant  effects of the tax system on 
55. At first blush, the pattern  of results in table 4 by labor supply elasticity may 
appear  counterintuitive.  One might  suspect that the efficiency  gain  from switching  from 
capital taxation  to labor taxation should be less the more elastic is labor supply with R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  27 
labor supply have raised the specter of large deadweight  losses on the 
margin  from progressive taxation.56  Proposals to modify the general 
income  tax toward  a proportional  tax system cite the potential  efficiency 
gains  from  mitigating  these distortions.S7 
Our findings for the case of capital taxation suggest that, in the 
presence  of significant  restrictions  on borrowing,  delays  in tax collection 
over an individual's  lifetime are important  in assessing the efficiency 
effects of tax reform.  For many  plausible  underlying  parameter  values, 
capital income taxation is efficiency-improving  because it effectively 
delays the collection of tax payments  over an individual's  life cycle. A 
switch from progressive  to proportional  income taxation  would speed 
up tax collection, raising tax rates on low-income consumers and 
reducing  their  consumption  substantially  when liquidity  constraints  are 
important. 
Proponents  of proportional  taxation have suggested that increased 
exemptions  could maintain  the equity  or political  acceptability  of the tax 
code.58  When borrowing  restrictions are important,  exemptions can 
serve efficiency  functions as well. Below, we examine the effects of 
going  from  a strictly  proportional  tax on all income to a "progressive" 
proportional  tax with an intercept-exemption-and  a single marginal 
tax rate that raises the same revenue. Including a sequence of tax 
brackets applying to different income levels would raise the welfare 
costs of progressive  taxation.  Our  aim  here is to call attention  to the role 
of exemptions,  to introduce  the possibility  that  progressive  taxation  per 
se need not carry a deadweight  loss. The implicit  trade-off  is between 
the saving and labor supply distortions  from higher  marginal  taxes on 
capital  and  labor  income  under  progressive  taxation  on the one hand  and 
the efficiency  gain from relaxing  borrowing  constraints  on low-income 
individuals  on the other. For low values of the intertemporal  elasticity 
of substitution  in consumption,  the latter  effect is likely to dominate;  for 
high  values, the former. 
respect to changes in the net wage. Here the intertemporal  distortion  from interest 
taxation is  more important  than the static consumption-leisure  distortion. That is, 
reducing  the intertemporal  distortion  dominates  the fact that  the static  distortion  becomes 
greater. 
56. See, for example, Hausman,  "Labor  Supply." 
57. See, for example, Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka,  The Flat Tax (Hoover 
Institution,  1985). 
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Using an exemption, we calculate the constant marginal  tax rate 
required  to raise  the same  revenue  as a proportional  income  tax at a rate 
of 30 percent. The exemption  is calibrated  to be two-thirds  of first-year 
earnings  (about 15 percent of highest earnings).  We simulate interest 
rate  values of 0.04 and  0.08, labor  supply  elasticity  values of 0.  1 and  0.5, 
and  a  values of 1.1, 0.5, 0.2, and  0.1. Dollar-equivalent  efficiency  gains 
and losses are calculated relative to taxes shifted. That is, for each 
individual,  the switch  to progressive  taxation  grants  an  income  increment 
equal to the present value of the new marginal  tax rate times the 
exemption  level, at a cost of higher  taxes paid on the margin  at the new 
marginal  tax rate. Our  percentage  efficiency  change  is calculated  as the 
quotient  of the dollar-equivalent  efficiency  gain  or loss and  this effective 
income change  from  the imposition  of the exemption. 
Results are reported  in table 5.59  The change to progressive  taxation 
leads to substantial  efficiency losses under  perfect capital  markets,  the 
losses increasing  with the magnitude  of the elasticity  of labor  supply, as 
expected. Even with the significant  increase in marginal  tax rates (and 
hence distortions, which initially rise with the square of the tax rate) 
required  to raise the same amount of revenue over the individual's 
59. While  an analysis of the transition  from the steady state of the economy under 
proportional  taxation to one with the progressive tax would be desirable, there are 
several  problems.  Most worrisome  is the fact that overlapping  generations  models such 
as these can have a continuum  of such transition  paths. See Timothy J. Kehoe and 
David K.  Levine, "Comparative  Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon 
Economies," Economnetrica,  vol. 53 (March  1985),  pp. 433-53, for a discussion  of these 
issues. 
The  presence  of a continuum  of transition  paths  means  that  the results  of comparative- 
dynamic  experiments  are indeterminate.  It is also true that there may be no transition 
path to a new steady state, implying that the imposition of a nonlinear  tax would 
precipitate  cyclical or chaotic behavior.  These perverse possibilities  are usually made 
more likely by the absence of a market, as is the case with our liquidity  constraints. 
Hence, the technical  problems  are beyond the scope of this study. 
Some attempts have been made at transition  analysis, but their results must be 
regarded  as tentative.  Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and Skinner  employ an algorithm  for which 
there  is at best only a proof  of local validity;  that  is, if the initial  guess is "close enough" 
to the answer,  then the algorithm  will converge  to the answer.  They do not rule out the 
possibility  that the algorithm  may stop at other points. Furthermore,  they do not show 
that there is only one such transition  path to find in their model. These points indicate 
that more  analysis  of their  algorithm  and model  is necessary  before  their  interesting  and 
important  results are fully validated. Finally, while we would like to have used their 
algorithm  for some indication  of transition  effects, it is not available,  and we have not 
endeavored  to redevelop  it independently  here. Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and  Skinner,  "The 
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lifetime, the inclusion  of borrowing  restrictions  in the analysis substan- 
tially mitigates  losses in all cases. For example, in the single individual 
case with  r = 0.04, a  = 0.5, and  q = 0. 1, the loss of 10.3  percent  (relative 
to taxes shifted) under  perfect capital markets  becomes a 2.3 percent 
gain  in the liquidity-constrained  regime.  Even more  striking  is the finding 
that for a relatively inelastic labor supply and a low intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution  in consumption, efficiency gains accompany 
progressive  taxation. That is, the exemption here serves an efficiency 
role in the presence of liquidity  constraints.60  Again, the results in the 
family  case are similar. 
Our  findings  in the experiments  with capital and labor taxation and 
with progressive  and  proportional  taxation  suggest  potential  gains  from 
a progressive tax on labor income only, with no taxation of interest 
income. Such a reform would mitigate  the impact of taxation on the 
consumption  of constrained  individuals  without introducing  the inter- 
temporal  distortions  inherent  in capital taxation. To examine this hy- 
pothesis, we simulate  a shift away from a proportional  general  income 
tax of 30 percent. The new system sets TK  =  0, imposing  all taxation  on 
labor  income and granting  the same exemption  as before. The constant 
marginal  tax rate on labor income above the exemption is raised to 
ensure revenue neutrality.  Results for the same parameters  as before, 
presented  in table 6, show that  exemptions  are  generally  less costly and 
more often beneficial  when imposed on top of a labor  income tax than 
when  imposed  on both  capital  and  labor  taxes. This  finding  validates  our 
intuition  that  the exemption  attacks  the liquidity-constraint  problem  and 
works  better  when it does not aggravate  intertemporal  distortions,  even 
though  it must aggravate  labor  supply  distortions  even more. 
Comparing  the findings  of tables  4, 5, and  6 reveals  the significance  of 
liquidity  constraints  for considering  alternative  tax changes. The effi- 
ciency changes  in table  4 can be expressed in units comparable  to those 
in tables 5 and 6, given information  on taxes shifted  relative  to lifetime 
taxes paid. As a benchmark,  the present  value of the exemption  is about 
one-fifth  of lifetime  taxes when intertemporal  substitution  is high, about 
one-third  of lifetime taxes when intertemporal  substitution  is low. The 
60. This is  in contrast to  simulations ignoring the potential effects of liquidity 
constraints.  For example, Hausman  finds that the welfare cost of progressive  income 
taxation  described  in this way increases with the amount  of the exemption. Hausman, 
"Labor  Supply," p. 64, table 1. 32  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
efficiency  changes  of all  three  policies considered  are  thus  of comparable 
magnitude. 
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  AND  EXTENSIONS 
This framework  for reconsidering  the efficiency  effects of tax reform 
suggests the potential importance  of other preexisting distortions in 
influencing  the outcome of changes  in fiscal policy. In particular,  many 
government  programs,  most notably social insurance  programs,  affect 
agents' lifetime budget  constraints  to the extent that private  insurance 
against  uncertainty  over length  of life,  job loss, catastrophic  illness, and 
so on, is incomplete.  When  social  insurance  is examined  in  the  framework 
of precautionary  saving, its provision will in general affect lifetime 
consumption and not just consumption during the periods in which 
payments  are  received.61 
Since Martin  Feldstein first examined the impact of social security 
over the life cycle, other studies have followed suit.62  Empirical  work 
has tested the impact on preretirement  consumption of the wealth 
transfers  accompanying  the introduction  of the existing pay-as-you-go 
social security system. Extending  this discussion, recent studies show 
that, in the context of lifetime  uncertainty,  even an actuarially  fair,  fully 
funded social security system could generate partial equilibrium  in- 
creases in lifetime welfare.63  Hence previous partial  equilibrium  esti- 
mates of the impact of social security on consumption  based on inter- 
generational  wealth transfers  at the introduction  of the system may be 
too small. 
The extent to which consumers  can spread  the benefits  from social 
security annuities  over their lifetimes depends on the degree to which 
capital  markets  permit  consumption  smoothing  when current  resources 
are insufficient.  More important,  the proportional  payroll tax used to 
61. Daniel S.  Hamermesh, "Social Insurance and Consumption:  An Empirical 
Inquiry,"  American  Economic Review, vol. 72 (March 1982),  pp. 101-113; Hubbard, 
" 'Precautionary'  Saving." 
62. Martin  Feldstein, "Social Security, Induced  Retirement  and Aggregate  Capital 
Accumulation,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 82 (September-October  1974),  pp. 
905-26. 
63. Andrew  B. Abel, "Precautionary  Saving and Accidental  Bequests," American 
Economic  Review, vol. 75 (September  1985),  pp. 777-91; Hubbard,  " 'Precautionary' 
Saving";  Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  33 
finance social security depresses consumption  dollar for dollar when 
liquidity  constraints  are binding.  Including  realistic limitations  on bor- 
rowing  in the life-cycle model introduces  the possibility  that increasing 
payroll-tax-financed  social security benefits may decrease utility to 
individuals  from  lifetime  consumption  while  increasing  potential  lifetime 
resources.  In a related  effort, we demonstrate  that  precautionary  saving 
within  the life-cycle model  may be even more  important  than  the effects 
of borrowing  restrictions  noted here in explaining  national  saving and 
also show that the steady-state  efficiency cost of social security under 
payroll-tax  finance  can be substantial.64  In keeping  with the results we 
have presented  here, some consideration  of alternative,  more progres- 
sive means of financing  the system, such as the use of earned income 
credits,  would  be useful. 
It might  also be useful to examine  the importance  of earnings  uncer- 
tainty, a potential motivation for lenders' unwillingness to finance 
noncollateralized  loans. In preliminary  calculations,  we do not find  that 
the introduction  of even substantial  variation  in an individual's  earnings 
in the presence of liquidity  constraints  affects our results to any great 
degree. The principal  effect of liquidity constraints on consumption 
comes from the resulting  inability  to achieve the desired consumption 
profile  over the life cycle. 
Tax Cuts, Deficits, and Consumption 
The issue of whether government budget deficits affect aggregate 
demand  lies at  the center  of another  important  debate  in  macroeconomics 
and  public  finance.  The recent resurgence  of arguments  for the "Ricar- 
dian equivalence"  proposition  that debt-financed  tax cuts should have 
no real effects on consumer spending  calls into question whether the 
life-cycle formulation  is an adequate  representation  of decisionmaking 
about consumption.65  Indeed, the arguments  claim that the operative 
planning  period  may  be the infinite  horizon  of a dynastic  family. 
The  planning  horizon  is a major  focus of the  debate  between  alternative 
schools of thought  on the potential  for economic stimulus  of temporary 
64. Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 
65. Barro, "Are Government  Bonds Net Wealth?" 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1.1986 
tax reductions.66  Olivier Blanchard  emphasizes the nonneutrality  of 
changes in the timing of taxes in a model of individuals with finite 
horizons.67  Below we also use a finite-horizon  model to highlight  the 
relative  importance  of liquidity  constraints  and  finite  life for the consid- 
eration  of Ricardian-neutrality  propositions.  Much  of the policy debate 
over Ricardian  equivalence hinges on the relevance of finite-horizon 
models. We show that  policy effectiveness arguments  are  more  affected 
by liquidity  constraints  than  by considerations  of finite  horizons. 
That individual consumers should respond less to temporary tax 
changes than to permanent  tax changes is noted in Milton Friedman's 
initial  treatment  of the permanent-income  hypothesis.68  Under  the basic 
version of the life-cycle model with only a lifetime  budget  constraint,  a 
temporary  tax cut followed by an anticipated  offsetting tax increase 
should  have no effect on consumer  spending.  An obvious qualification 
is that  the aggregate  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of a temporary 
tax cut will be positive to the extent that liquidity  constraints  affect a 
substantial  number  of consumers.69  Empirical  studies  note at least some 
sensitivity  of consumer  spending  to temporary  tax changes.70  In partic- 
66. See,  for example, Barro, "Are Government Bonds Net  Wealth?"; Martin 
Feldstein, "Government  Deficits and Aggregate  Demand,"  Journal of Monetaty Eco- 
nomics, vol. 9 (January  1982),  pp. 1-20. 
67. Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "Debt, Deficits,  and Finite  Horizons,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 93 (April 1985),  pp. 223-47. 
68.  Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function  (Princeton University 
Press, 1957). See also the formal statement  in Robert Eisner, "Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy Reconsidered,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 59 (December  1969),  pp. 897- 
905. 
69. Note that this effect is more important  still the more the number  of constrained 
consumers  increases  in economic downturns. 
70. Arthur  Okun  used the consumption  equations  of four macroeconometric  models 
to analyze the effects of the 1968 surtax and found that the "full effect" view fit the 
data better (in the sense of a smaller root mean square error in simulations)  than a 
"zero effect" interpretation.  Blinder and Robert Solow found that an "intermediate 
view" did better  still. William  Springer  used a consumption  function  more  closely based 
on the permanent-income  hypothesis,  concluding  that the zero effect view more  closely 
described  the outcome. Thomas Juster reached similar  conclusions to those of Okun 
for the 1975  rebate, while Modigliani  and Charles  Steindel  found very little short-term 
effect. Arthur  Okun, "The Personal  Tax Surcharge  and Consumer  Demand, 1968-70," 
BPEA, 1:1971, pp.  167-204; Alan S.  Blinder and Robert M.  Solow,  "Analytical 
Foundations  of Fiscal Policy," in Alan S. Blinder  and others, eds., The Economics of 
Public Finance (Brookings, 1974), pp. 3-115; William L.  Springer, "Did the  1968 
Surcharge  Really Work?"  Ame-ican Economic  Review, vol. 65 (September  1975),  pp. R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  35 
ular, Blinder  finds, in a 1981  paper, that consumers treat a temporary 
tax change  as half ordinary  income change  and  half  windfall.7'  In a 1985 
paper  coauthored  with Angus Deaton, however, Blinder  finds that the 
short-run  effects of temporary  tax changes correspond  more closely to 
those predicted by the permanent-income  hypothesis.72  Within the 
framework  of the analytical  model described earlier, we can examine 
the extent to  which borrowing restrictions can generate effects of 
temporary  tax changes  that are consistent with some of these empirical 
studies. 
At least three obstacles make  econometric  analysis  of temporary  tax 
changes  difficult.  First, as noted  by Arthur  Okun  and  Blinder,  consumer 
responses to tax increases or decreases depend not so much on the 
announcement  of whether they are temporary  or permanent,  but on 
whether  consumers  believe they are  temporary  or permanent.73  Second, 
in a progressive  tax system, tax rate cuts or rebates based on previous 
tax payments  involve relatively small changes for those with very low 
incomes and little or no tax obligation.  Deviations from predictions  of 
the permanent-income  hypothesis may therefore  be difficult  to detect 
even when  a significant  fraction  of the population  is liquidity  constrained 
in the sense defined  here. Finally, the existence of a set of constrained 
consumers does not imply that the aggregate  marginal  propensity to 
consume (MPC)  out of an explicitly temporary  tax cut is equal to the 
proportion  of the population  that is liquidity  constrained.74  Clearly,  for 
very small  changes,  constrained  individuals  will  spend  the  entire  increase 
in resources; for large enough changes, the constraint  may no longer 
bind.  In  general,  even liquidity-constrained  individuals  will smooth  their 
644-59; F. Thomas Juster, "A Note on Prospective 1977 Tax Cuts and Consumer 
Spending" (University of Michigan, January 1977); Franco Modigliani  and Charles 
Steindel, "Is a Tax Rebate an Effective Tool for Stabilization  Policy?" BPEA,  1:1977, 
pp. 175-203. 
71. Alan S. Blinder,  "Temporary  Income  Taxes and Consumer  Spending,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 89 (February  1981),  pp. 26-53. See also R. Glenn Hubbard, 
"Temporary  Tax Reductions  as Responses to Oil Shocks," in Alvin L. Alm and  Robert 
J. Weiner,  eds., Oil Shock: Policy Response  and Implementation (Ballinger  Press, 1984), 
pp. 121-28. 
72. Blinder  and Deaton, "The Time Series Consumption  Function  Revisited." 
73. Okun, "The Personal  Tax Surcharge";  Blinder, "Temporary  Income Taxes." 
74. This approach  is taken  in Hall and Mishkin,  "The Sensitivity  of Consumption"; 
and in Hayashi, "The Permanent  Income Hypothesis." 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
consumption  response  to the increase  in resources  so as to avoid swings 
in consumption. 
LIQUIDITY  CONSTRAINTS  AND  RICARDIAN  NEUTRALITY 
To capture the importance of liquidity constraints for analyzing 
whether  temporary  tax changes affect aggregate  demand,  we make  use 
of a tractable  analytical  model. We consider  a simple  economy in which 
the number of births is constant each year and each person has a 
probability  p of dying each year. This form of uncertainty  about life 
expectancy is highly stylized and serves only to create a finite-horizon 
problem,  not to calculate  age-related  marginal  propensities  to consume 
per se. To focus on life-cycle effects, we capture  the essence of a rising 
lifetime earnings profile by assuming that each person begins work 
earning  a wage of wl and has a probability  q each year of experiencing 
an increase  in his wage to w2. In the steady state, the share  of the labor 
force in the high-productivity  state is 02  =  ql(p  +  q); the share in the 
low-productivity  state, 01  =  pl(p  +  q). Also, the total wage income 
going to low-productivity  workers equals Olwl per living person, and 
wage income to high-productivity  workers  is 02w2  per capita. 
All agents are assumed to have logarithmic  utility  functions defined 
over consumption; this is just  an example from the more general 
specifications  used in the simulation  exercises before. Therefore,  if T  is 
the time of death, utility  is given by 
(8)  U =  ET{  e-Ptlncdt} 
where p is  the rate of time preference. This assumption simplifies 
exposition because logarithmic  utility implies that an individual's  con- 
sumption  in each period is proportional  to his human  capital-that  is, 
the expected present value of future wages plus financial  assets-in 
perfect capital  markets.  More specifically,  if h is the expected present 
value of all future wage income and a is financial  wealth, then the 
individual  consumption  function, c (derived  in appendix  B), is 
(9)  c = (p + p)(h + a). 
To determine  aggregate  consumption,  it is necessary to compute  the 
human  capital  of both the low- and  high-productivity  workers.  Since the R. Glenn  Hubbard  and Kenneth  L. Judd  37 
concern  is with aggregate  indexes, HI and  H2  are  defined  as the expected 
present value per capita of all future wages paid to those currently  in 
low- and high-productivity  states, respectively. If A is the financial 
wealth per capita  of those currently  alive, the sum  A + HI + H2  is the 
total  wealth  of the current  population. 
Where capital markets  are perfect and there are no restrictions  on 
borrowing,75  aggregate  consumption,  C, is given by 
(10)  C = (p + p)(A  + HI + H2). 
In the steady state of the aggregate  economy, HI, H2, and  A assume the 
values  H*, H2*,  and  A*, respectively, where 
(1  1)  H*=  + 
(  )  l  (P  +  q  (P  +r)  (  +  q)  p  +r  )(  +  q +  r) 
W202  (12)  H*=  , and  2  p  +  r 
(13)  A*  =  w2(r -  p)  + (W  -  W2(  p  q  + r -  p 
(p + p  +  r)(p +  r)  p + p  +  r  +  q  q ++p  +  r 
Assume r >  p, so that  A* >  0. The human  capital  of high-productivity 
individuals  is obtained  by means of a simple  present-value  calculation. 
The coefficient  H* is a weighted  average  of the discounted  low-produc- 
tivity earnings  and  later  high-productivity  earnings,  adjusted  for transi- 
tion probabilities.  See the more  detailed  discussion  in appendix  B. 
If an individual  enters the economy with no assets and can borrow 
against future earnings, he may take on some debt. When he starts 
working,  he has his low-productivity  human  capital, hl, where 
(14)  h=  +  (  w')  (  q + 
p +r  p +r  +  q +r 
That is, h, represents  the discounted  value of receiving w, until death, 
plus the discounted  value of the difference  until death between w2  and 
wl, times the probability  of reaching  high  productivity,  ql(p + q), times 
75. That  capital  markets  are perfect  implies  the ability  both to borrow  against  future 
earnings  and to insure  against  a delayed transition  into high productivity  and long life. 
Here we will assume the existence of annuity markets. For an examination  of the 
implications  of their absence and of liquidity  constraints  for social security financing, 
see Hubbard  and Judd, "Social Security." 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
the expected discount  factor  at the time  of that  transition  conditional  on 
having  reached  high  productivity,  (p + q)l(p +  q  +  r). The inclusion  of 
the second term  in h1  is due to the perfect  capital  market  that allows the 
individual  to borrow  against  the future  high-productivity  wage stream. 
Desired  consumption  in the initial  period  is 
(15)  co = (p + p)hI = p + r ws[  +  W  1  q 
Note that  co>  w1  if w2  is much  greater  than  w1, or if q is large  relative  to 
p  +  r. Intuitively, initial consumption  exceeds the initial wage if the 
initial  wage is much smaller  than subsequent  wages or if the transition 
to higher  wages is especially  rapid. 
If low-wage  individuals  cannot  borrow  against  future  high  wages and 
desired initial consumption  exceeds the initial wage, consumption  be- 
havior  is substantially  affected. For the case in which  q is high  and  assets 
are zero for constrained  individuals,  we need only examine I12*  and  A* 
in the aggregate  analysis, since consumption  equals  the wage for all low- 
productivity  workers.  Therefore,  in the steady state of the constrained 
system, 
(16)  H*-  W202  anid  (16)  2  ~~~~p  + r' 
(17)  A* =  w202 (r -  p)  =(p 
? 
p  ?  r)(p  ?  r) 
As expected, the constrained  equilibrium  yields a greater  steady-state 
asset level, the increase  equaling 
W2 -  WI  p  q +  r-  p 
p + p +  r  p +  q  q +  r + p/ 
The difference  is large  as the productivity  difference  and  the proportion 
of liquidity-constrained  individuals  is greater.  The ratio  of steady-state 
asset levels in the constrained  and  unconstrained  cases is 
W2  -w  )(p  q  q+r  p-(p+r\ 
p+p+r  \\  q  q  q+r?+  p  rI  -  p 
As with the earlier  simulations,  this fraction  is not trivial.  For example, 
if p  =  0.02, q =  0.08, r  =  0.04, p =  0.015, and w,  =  0.7w2, then the 
capital  stock is 14  percent  smaller  in the unconstrained  case. R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  39 
The  effects of temporary  tax changes  on consumption  can  be analyzed 
easily in this framework.  As the simplest possible case, suppose that 
taxes, T(t),  per capita are imposed at time t.  Viewing such taxes as 
reductions  in the wage shows that the human capital of each current 
worker  at time t is reduced  by 
(18)  T(t)  =  f  e-(s  -  t) e -P(s -  t) T(s)ds. 
As pointed  out by Blanchard,  debt-financed  tax cuts are  not neutral  even 
in the presence of perfect capital markets,  since a reduction  in current 
taxation  financed  by higher  taxation  of future  generations  stimulates  a 
positive  wealth  effect  for  the  current  generation,  causing  its consumption 
to rise.76 
This  perfect-markets  impact  is small,  however. Suppose,  for  example, 
that  T(t)  is decreased  by dT  during  the interval  [0, tj], with a compensat- 
ing tax increase  of e  '2 during  the interval  [t2, t,  +  t2]. In that case, total 
human capital net of  taxes for individuals at t  =  0 increases by 
(1  -  e-Pt2)  (1  e  -(" +  P)ti)  (r  + p)- 1.  Therefore, the marginal propensity 
to consume  out of a debt-financed  tax cut, m, is 
(19)  m = dC = (p + p)  e-Pt2)  e  +  P)t) 
The marginal  propensity to consume out of a tax cut involves the 
three  terms on the right-hand  side of the equation.  The first, (p + p), is 
the MPC  out of increments  to wealth.  The other  two terms  comprise  the 
increment  to wealth. That increment  is greater  the longer the tax cut 
lasts and the longer is the delay before the compensating  tax increase. 
The present value of the tax cut during  [0, t,] is (1 -  e-(r + P)tl)l(r  +  p). 
Only 1 -  e-Pt, of that is left after expected  future taxes are considered. 
While (p + p)l(r + p) may very well be close to unity,-  the other terms 
are substantial  only if p, tl, or t2 is large. For example, if p  =  0.02, 
p =  0.015, r =  0.04, t,  =  5, and t2 =  20, we are considering a five-year 
tax cut financed  with a twenty-year  delay, during  which time people die 
at a rate  of 2 percent  a year. In this case, the MPC  out of a tax cut would 
be only about 0.05, even though we postulated an extended tax cut 
financed  with a relatively  long delay. 
76. Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "Debt, Deficits,  and Finite  Horizons,"  Journal  of Political 
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Results  in a liquidity-constrained  regime  are quite  different.  Suppose 
low-productivity  workers  consume  their  wage. Then the impact  of a tax 
cut is just 
(20)  dC =  01 dT, +  02dT2, 
where dTi is the size of the tax cut for workers  of productivity  wi. The 
aggregate  MPC  out of the tax cut, 
-  =01  dT,  +  02mdT2 
(21)  1OdTl  +  02dT2 
will be substantially  higher. Suppose 0,  =  0.20 and dT1  =  dT2. The 
aggregate  MPC  becomes 0.24, not 0.05. The MPC  is more  than  quadru- 
pled by assuming that only 20 percent of the work force is liquidity 
constrained.  With  shorter  delays, this contrast  is even more striking. 
This result  is straightforward:  the aggregate  MPC  out of a temporary 
tax change  is just a weighted  average  of the low MPCs  of unconstrained 
households and the high MPCs, equal to unity, of constrained  house- 
holds. Under such a modeling  structure,  econometric  evidence on the 
effect of temporary  tax changes on consumption  could be used to infer 
the importance  of liquidity-constrained  consumers  in the determination 
of aggregate  consumption.  These findings  are of particular  interest for 
the debate  over tests of Ricardian  equivalence.  While  finite  horizons  per 
se are not likely to be of much  significance  for analyses  of whether  fiscal 
policy changes are neutral  with respect to aggregate  demand, capital- 
market  imperfections  should  be quantitatively  important  in invalidating 
neutrality  propositions. 
EFFECTS  OF  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  TAX  CUTS  ON  CONSUMPTION 
The formulation  of m in equation 21 highlights  the importance  of 
the  distribution of  the tax  cut.  Letting  f  =  dT2IdT,, we  can  rewrite 
equation  21 as: 
01 +  e2Qlm 
(22)  M 
=01  +  02Q_ 
When dT1  and dT2 are not equal, liquidity constraints become less 
important.  For example, if instead of a uniform  tax cut, low-income 
workers  enjoy  a smaller  absolute  tax cut than  high-income  workers  do- 
both cuts financed separately by later increases in taxes in the same R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  41 
class-then  -m  is reduced. This case is, of course, a more relevant and 
realistic  one to examine.  Many  changes  in progressive  tax systems result 
in greater  relative  relief  for the high-income  group.  Changes  in tax struc- 
ture making  the system more progressive, such as increases in exemp- 
tions  compensated  by higher  marginal  tax rates,  render  smaller  the aggre- 
gate MPC  out of a temporary  tax cut. That  is, under  a progressive  system 
with an exemption  w and  marginal  tax rate  t, fl  =  (W2 -  W)/ (wI  -  W). If, 
for example, fl  =  2, the m calculated  before  falls to about  0.16. Making 
the tax system less progressive  increases the fraction  of the population 
constrained,  raising  the sensitivity  of aggregate  consumption  to tempo- 
rary  tax changes. 
The results of these cases for both infinite-horizon  (that is, where 
p = 0) and  finite-horizon  models  are  summarized  in table  7 under  various 
assumptions about the proportion  of the population that is liquidity 
constrained.  The aggregate  MPCs  are calculated  for a five-year  tax cut 
financed by either a twenty-year delay or a ten-year delay. Three 
conclusions are readily apparent. First, the significant variation in 
aggregate  MPCs  stems primarily  from  capital  market  imperfections,  not 
from changes in the planning horizon. Second,  shorter delays for 
compensating  tax increases only reinforce  the relatively  greater  MPCs 
associated with the presence of liquidity constraints. Third, distribu- 
tional  features  of tax cuts are  important  in  both  finite-horizon  and  infinite- 
horizon  models  when liquidity  constraints  are considered. 
The dependence  of the aggregate  MPC  on the structure  of the tax cut 
points  up clearly  the potential  problems  of using  estimates  of the effects 
of temporary  tax changes  on consumption  to make  inferences  about  the 
importance  of liquidity-constrained  consumers  in the economy. In the 
simple  examples  noted above, the underlying  fraction  of the population 
with constrained consumption was held constant, yet MPCs varied 
substantially  with respect to lump-sum,  proportional,  and progressive 
tax reductions. In particular,  to the extent that many previous actual 
policy experiments  involved temporary  changes in nonlinear  tax sys- 
tems, their  effects on consumption  would  be small  even in the presence 
of a substantial  number  of liquidity-constrained  consumers. 
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
Thus far, we have concentrated  on the income effects of tax policy. 
But taxes are not lump-sum  and  have substitution  effects as well. While 42  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1986 
Table 7.  Simulated Aggregate Marginal Propensity to Consume Out of a Temporary 
Tax Cut" 
Percent 
Perfect  Liquidity constraints 
Fraction  of population  capital  Lump-sum  Non-lump-sum 
liquidity-constrainedb  markets  tax cutc  tax  CUtd 
Infinite-horizon modele 
Twenty-year delay 
o  o  0  0 
10  0  10  5.3 
20  0  20  11.1 
25  0  25  14.3 
Ten-year delay 
0  0  0  0 
10  0  10  5.3 
20  0  20  11.1 
25  0  25  14.3 
Finite-horizon  model' 
Twenty-year delay 
0  5.0  5.0  5.0 
10  5.0  14.5  10.0 
20  5.0  24.0  15.6 
25  5.0  28.8  18.6 
Ten-year delay 
0  2.7  2.7  2.7 
10  2.7  12.4  7.8 
20  2.7  22.2  13.5 
25  2.7  27.0  16.6 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  The  aggregate marginal propensity  to consume  is calculated  for a five-year  tax cut financed by a twenty-year 
delay or a ten-year delay.  The experiment  is discussed  in the text. 
b.  Corresponds  to O1 in the model. 
c.  dTj =  dT-2  in the model. 
d.  The  aggregate  marginal propensity  to consume  is governed  by equation  22 in the  text  under the assumption 
that Ql =  2. 
e.  The optimizing horizon is infinite. 
f.  The optimizing horizon is finite. 
a complete integration  is beyond the scope of our efforts here, we can 
relate our results to other discussions of Ricardian  neutrality  that do 
consider  the distortionary  substitution  effects that  arise  from  taxation. 
Judd  shows that  in a perfect-foresight  representative-consumer  model, 
a substitution  of debt  for  taxes will  often  lead  to an  anti-Keynesian  effect; 
that  is, the MPC  out of the tax cut is negative.77  The explanation  is clear. 
77. Kenneth L.  Judd, "Debt and Distortionary  Taxes,"  Journal of  Monetaty 
Economics,  forthcoming. R. Glenn Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd  43 
A tax cut today  followed  by a future  tax increase  will  increase  the welfare 
cost of taxation, since the future tax increase will depress the future 
capital stock, whereas the current  tax cut cannot increase the current 
capital stock.  This adverse income effect on current consumption 
accentuates the substitution,  or price, effect arising  from the lowered 
cost of future  consumption.  Hence, both price and  income  effects act to 
reduce  consumption  if taxes are  temporarily  reduced.  Furthermore,  the 
magnitude  of this effect is comparable  to the income effect of bonds in 
standard  Keynesian  analysis  of debt  versus taxes and  hence is not trivial 
by the standards  of this debate. Therefore,  incorporating  distortionary 
taxation  into the debt-versus-taxes  debate introduces  a significant  and 
opposing  element. 
These observations  make  clear  three  forces that  should  be considered 
in thinking  about  the reaction  of aggregate  consumption  to tax changes. 
First, there  will be intergenerational  wealth redistribution,  the focus of 
finite-life analyses. Second, and quantitatively more important, re- 
sponses  will be affected  by liquidity  constraints.  Third,  income  and  price 
effects due to  the distortionary nature of  taxation will also affect 
consumption. Synthesizing these three considerations suggests the 
following. For those who actively participate  in the capital  market,  the 
wealth-redistribution  and distortionary-tax  effects are both important 
but act to cancel each other, since they pull consumption  in opposite 
directions.  Liquidity-constrained  consumers  are  not going  to be affected 
by changing savings incentives and will react strongly to net-of-tax 
income changes. However, most reforms do not give much absolute 
relief  to affected  low-income  groups.  Hence the aggregate  MPC  is likely 
to be small. 
Conclusions  and Extensions 
The existence of liquidity  constraints  as a preexisting  distortion  is 
important  in the determination  of consumption  behavior  in a life-cycle 
model. Forced  lifetime  saving  due to liquidity  constraints  is substantial, 
and  if the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  is small, 
the incorporation  of borrowing  constraints  enables the life-cycle model 
to generate more realistic predictions  about the size of the aggregate 
capital  stock. Further  econometric  work  on estimating  the magnitude  of 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1  986 
the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  in consumption  will facilitate 
future  policy analysis  of the implications  of liquidity  constraints. 
The normative  side of our analysis has shown that consideration  of 
liquidity  constraints  also will have a significant  impact  on how one views 
various  tax changes.  Many  of the principal  findings  about  the saving  and 
welfare  effects of tax  reforms  drawn  from  fiscal-policy  simulation  models 
rely heavily on the assumption  that capital  markets  are perfect and that 
individuals can borrow and lend freely to  smooth consumption in 
response to policy changes. When  liquidity  constraints  are allowed  for, 
theoretical  predictions  about  the efficiency  effects of altering  the relative 
reliance  on various  tax bases or the degree  of progressivity  of the income 
tax are no longer  clear. 
Our  conclusions here are two. First, arguments  that reduced  capital 
income taxation financed by increased labor income taxation raises 
individual  welfare  depend  on a substantial  interest  sensitivity of saving 
in the life-cycle framework  and on the ability of consumers with low 
current  earnings  to borrow  to finance  higher  labor income taxes. With 
borrowing  restrictions, the gains from higher saving rates and output 
must be weighed against the efficiency losses from the reduced con- 
sumption of constrained individuals. For some plausible parameter 
values, elimination  of capital income taxation compensated  by higher 
labor  income  taxation  can reduce  the welfare  of a representative  individ- 
ual. 
In a similar  vein, recent  analyses  of progressive  taxation  focus on the 
disincentive  effects on work  effort  and  saving  of high  marginal  tax rates. 
A move toward  proportional  taxation  would  indeed  reduce  these effects, 
but, in the presence of the borrowing  constraints  discussed here, would 
also reduce  the consumption  of constrained  low-income  individuals.  We 
find that the use of an exemption  and a higher  marginal  tax rate can in 
some cases improve efficiency relative to a proportional  tax. That is, 
there may be significant  efficiency gains from using exemptions. If we 
combine  these findings  with  those from  the capital  taxation  experiments, 
it may be that replacing  capital taxes with a progressive tax on labor 
earnings  could be efficiency-improving. 
Further  extensions that take into account similar restrictions will 
likely reinforce  these conclusions. For example, an inability  to insure 
against wage uncertainty  implies that liquidity constraints  may occur 
not only in the early and middle stages of life but also later if adverse R. Glenn Hlubbard  and Kenneth L. Jludd  45 
wage shocks occur in those periods. The addition  of uncertainty  to the 
model  would introduce  portfolio  decisions for the individual  that  would 
also be distorted  by the liquidity  considerations.  Such  distortions  would 
likely be aggravated  by tax policies that increase the severity of the 
liquidity  constraints.  While our analysis focuses on a tractable  type of 
capital  market  imperfection,  it is likely that  the addition  of more  realistic 
elements  will reinforce  our  results. 
Finally, liquidity  constraints  are important  for analyzing  the effects 
of deficit-financed  tax cuts on consumption.  Liquidity-constraint  consid- 
erations  are likely to dominate  finite-horizon  effects in determining  the 
aggregate  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of temporary  tax cuts. In 
addition,  the presence  of a significant  number  of constrained  consumers 
earning  a nontrivial  proportion  of aggregate  disposable  income does not 
necessarily  imply that temporary  tax changes  will be effective in modi- 
fying the level of consumer  spending.  In general,  the distribution  of tax 
changes  matters.  The benefits  of past tax cuts have gone largely  to high- 
income  groups,  so that  measured  effects on consumption  could  be small 
even with a substantial number of potentially affected consumers. 
Hence, it is difficult  to make  inferences  about  the aggregate  importance 
of liquidity constraints from econometric studies of temporary tax 
changes. 
Our findings suggest the importance  of considering  capital market 
imperfections  as preexisting  distortions  in normative  and  positive anal- 
yses in macroeconomics  and public  finance. The results do not depend 
on any extreme  form  of optimizing  behavior  on the part  of individuals  or 
households. Similar results might also be obtained in approaches in 
which individuals  force themselves to precommit  to saving  strategies  to 
avoid deprivation  because of a lack of self-control.  Indeed, our formal 
conclusions are not inconsistent with the  "quest for self-control" 
arguments  of Thomas  Schelling  or of Richard  Thaler  and  Hersh Shefrin 
as long as there is at least some period in which the "optimizing  self" 
commits  to plans  to bind  the "wastrel  self."78 
78. T.  C.  Schelling, "Egonomics, or the Art of  Self Management,"  Ametican 
Economic  Review,  vol.  68  (May  1978, Papets  and  Proceedings,  1977),  pp.  290-94; 
Thaler  and  Shefrin,  "An Economic  Theory  of Self-Control."  We do not seek to describe 
the evolution of particular  institutions such as Christmas  clubs or certain forms of 
private  pensions. In fact, to the extent that such institutions  are set up by an individual 
to impose discipline  on himself and to provide for future needs, our model is implied 
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Much  more  theoretical  and  empirical  research  is needed  on taxpayers' 
decisions about consumption, saving, and labor supply and on the 
responsiveness  of those decisions  to public  policies. Theoretical  research 
should  probe  more  closely the origins  of liquidity  constraints  (and  capital 
market imperfections  more generally) in consumer finance and their 
implications  for  intragenerational  and  intergenerational  issues in optimal 
taxation.  Realistic  consideration  of imperfections  in  the  markets  in  which 
taxpayers  carry  out their plans and the implications  of these imperfec- 
tions for "second-best"  policy design  is an important  research  strategy. 
APPENDIX  A 
Consideration of Elastic Labor Supply 
FOR THE  CASE  of variable  labor  supply,  we rewrite  the individual's  lifetime 
utility  function  in equation 1 as being additively  separable  in consump- 
tion, c, and  leisure, 1: 
T 
(Al)  f[U(c)  -  V(l  -  )]e-Ptdt, 
where  the labor  endowment  is normalized  to unity  (that  is, labor  supply, 
L-"hours"-is  equal to 1 -  1). Again assuming an isoelastic utility 
function,  we let 
(A2)  U(c)  -  -and 
(A3)  V(l -1)  =  (  -  1) 
where y measures  the intensity  of leisure  (that  is, regulates  the marginal 
rate of substitution  between consumption and leisure) and -q is the 
compensated  elasticity  of labor  supply. 
Individual  net earnings  (E in the text) can now be decomposed  as the 
product of  the after-tax wage rate (per efficiency unit), individual R. Glenn  Hubbard  and Kenneth  L. Judd  47 
productivity  per hour, and hours worked. Denoting the gross wage, 
labor  tax rate, and  productivity  by w, TL, and  e, respectively, we have 
(A4)  E =  (I -  TL)we  (l-I)  L 
Arbitrage  conditions  yield 
(A5)  U'(C)  X, and 
(A6)  V'(L) =  wA. 
Hence labor  supply  is equal  to 
(A7)  L =min[1,  ) 
so that  if L  < 1, 
(A8)  w U'(c)  =  V'(L), or 
(A9)  L  = 
In our parameterizations,  we vary the intertemporal  elasticity of 
substitution  and the labor  supply  elasticity across a range  suggested  by 
various  empirical  studies. In varying  these parameters,  we also vary y 
so as to keep the consumption  of leisure in the first period of life, if 
constrained,  equal  to 0.6. This is done to model  the observation  that  40- 
50 percent of available hours are spent on work. When we vary the 
interest  rate  we also adjust  the wage profile  to keep the wage-rental  ratio 
constant. This adjustment  ensures that we are examining the same 
production  function  as we vary our  parameters. 
Our  specification  of utility makes the special assumption  of additive 
separability  between consumption  and leisure. This specification  was 
assumed  by MaCurdy.79  Also, MaCurdy  estimates  a more  general  utility 
function,  but could not reject separability.80 
For the human capital vector, e, we took Davies's fourth-degree 
polynomial  estimate of earnings.  An alternative  would be the estimate 
by Welch  for  full-time  workers  with  a  high-school  education.81  Auerbach, 
79. Thomas E. MaCurdy,  "An Empirical  Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle 
Setting,"  Joulrnal  of Political Economy,  vol. 89 (December  1981),  pp. 1059-85. 
80. MaCurdy,  "A Simple  Scheme." 
81. Welch, "Effects  of Cohort  Size." 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Kotlikoff, and Skinner  used this in their study, though  they omitted a 
term.82  Welch's estimated  equation  for human  capital  of a worker  with t 
years' experience  is 
ln e(t) =  -  .86 max  {0,  1 -  t/7} +  .033 t -  .00067 t2 +  po, 
where P0  is the intercept  term.  Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and  Skinner  did not 
use the initial  "spline" term,  to use Welch's  terminology.  In their  study, 
this choice probably  was of no importance,  but here it represents  the 
difference  between  being  liquidity  constrained  or not, the prime  interest 
of our study. We do not report  the results corresponding  to the Welch 
specification  of human  capital  endowment,  since  they  were  indistinguish- 
able  from  the ones reported. 
In the family case we use the Dolde family weights and household 
earnings profile.83  When the Dolde numbers are contrasted with the 
estimated family-size effects of MaCurdy  and Gilbert  Ghez and Gary 
Becker, they put relatively large weights on the consumption of a 
marginal  family  member.84  We argue  that  the Dolde weights  are  an upper 
bound  on the importance  of family-size  effects and therefore  an appro- 
priate  limit  case for us to examine  and  contrast  with the single case that 
ignores  family-size  effects. 
APPENDIX  B 
Analytical Model of Borrowing Constraints 
and Consumption 
AGENTS ARE ASSUMED  to maximize  utility  given by 
(B1)  U =  ET{  e-Ptlncdt}, 
where the variables  are as defined  in the text. 
82. Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and  Skinner,  "The Efficiency  Gains." 
83. Dolde, "Capital  Markets." 
84. MaCurdy,  "A Simple Scheme"; Gilbert R. Ghez and Gary S.  Becker, The 
Allocation of Time and Goods over the Life Cycle (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
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The evolution  of human  capital  of low- and  high-productivity  individ- 
uals (HI and H2, respectively) can be determined straightforwardly. 
Since a proportion  pdt of current  high-productivity  workers  die during 
(t, t + dt), and  the market  discounts  future  wealth  at the interest  rate, r, 
H2  obeys 
(B2)  H2(t)  =  w202dt  +  (1 -  rdt)(1 -  pdt) H2 (t +  dt). 
This equation  states that  the current  human  capital  of high-productivity 
workers equals the current wage flow plus the present value of the 
expected human  capital of the current  workers, who are a proportion 
1 -  pdt of high-productivity  workers  dt units  of time in the future.  (This 
appeals to the assumption  that our population  is in a steady state in 
which  the number  of transitions  from  low to high  productivity  equals  the 
deaths of high-productivity  workers.) This can be expressed as the 
differential  equation 
(B3)  H2 =  -w202  +  (p +  r)H2. 
To determine  HI, we must take into account both deaths and transi- 
tions to high productivity. With probability qdt a low-productivity 
worker  becomes high-productivity,  and  with  probability  pdt dies. Hence 
the current  low-productivity  workers  are 1 -  (p + q)dt of tomorrow's 
low-productivity  workers.  The  qdt  proportion  that  become  high-produc- 
tivity workers  comprise  a pdt proportion  of all such workers  tomorrow, 
and  hence tomorrow  will have  pdt of H2.  Therefore, 
(B4)  HI (t) =  w10I  dt +  (1 -  pdt)(l  -  rdt)[(l  -  qdt)HI (t +  dt) 
+ pdtH2(t  +  dt)]. 
In differential  equation  form, this becomes 
(B5)  Hj  =  -w1OI  +  (p +  q +  r)HI -  pH2. 
Financial  assets per capita,  A, follow 
(B6)  A  =  rA+  wIOI  + w202  -  OC-  02C2 
where CI(C2) is the average consumption  of low- (high-) productivity 
workers. 
When  borrowing  against  future  earnings  is not allowed, consumption 
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we  need only examine H2 and A  in the aggregate analysis, since 
consumption  equals  the wage for all low-productivity  workers.  Hence, 
(B7)  H2 =  -w202  +  (p + r)H2, and 
(B8)  A= w202  +  rA-  (p + p) (H2 + A). 
If agents  cannot  borrow  against  future  earnings,  they may save in the 
initial low-productivity  state. The following analysis determines the 
nature  of savings  and  consumption  paths  for that  case. 
Since consumption  when the high-productivity  state is reached  will 
be (p + p) [A +  w2  (p +  r)- 1]  if assets are  A, the marginal  value  of assets 
at the moment of transition will be (p + p)-I  [A +  w2(p +  r)- 1] -1, which 
is V'(A)  if V(A)  is defined  to be the value  of assets in the high-productivity 
state. An individual  in the low-productivity  state will therefore  face the 
following  problem: 
(B9)  max  e - (P+P  +  q)t  [ln c +  qV(A)]  dt, subject to 
A =  (r + p)A  +  w1 -  c. 
This  problem  differs  because the budget  constraint  does not include  any 
insurance  payment a worker receives when he fails to move to high 
productivity.  That insurance  was implicitly assumed above when we 
focused on perfect  capital  markets.  Arbitrage  implies  that 
(B1O)  c  =  (p +  q -  r)c + 
Phase-diagram  analysis of equation B10 and the budget constraint  in 
equation B9 shows that, if q is high and assets are initially  zero, low- 
productivity  individuals  consume  their  wage. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert  E. Hall: I admire  Glenn  Hubbard  and Kenneth  Judd's  daring  in 
presenting  a long and  detailed  defense of the proposition  that  the United 
States saves too much. Thanks to our society's unwillingness  to let 
young  people borrow  against  future  earnings,  our capital  stock may be 
close to double  its optimal  size, according  to their  findings.  Policies that 
would  help  families  save less over their  lifetimes-for  example, a larger 
exemption  in the income tax-would  raise national  welfare. The paper 
is a refreshing  change from the prevailing  view that saving and capital 
formation  are  inadequate  in the United States of the eighties. Of course, 
Hubbard  and  Judd  agree  that  other  factors  probably  work  in the opposite 
direction,  to discourage  saving. 
The basic idea of the paper is one supported  by the findings  of a 
number  of authors  recently: the young would like to have negative net 
worth, but nobody will lend to them because of bankruptcy  law and 
other  reasons. Consequently,  the young keep their  net worth  at exactly 
zero;  that  is, they consume  all of their  income. Empirical  studies  confirm 
that  relatively  few young  families  have positive net worth,  especially  net 
worth  outside  of housing  equity. 
Hubbard  and Judd  give a good deal of attention  to intergenerational 
issues in the family. They point out that the expectation  of inheritance 
in late middle  age only worsens the problem  of suboptimal  consumption 
by the young. Loans and  gifts inter  vivos could  go the other  way, but  the 
authors  consider this unlikely to have an important  effect in lessening 
the burden  of liquidity  constraints. 
My point of maximum  discomfort  with this line of thought  relates to 
the role of the family.  It is well within  the capabilities  of many  families- 
perhaps  a majority-to overcome the problem  of suboptimal  consump- 
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tion. Yet it is my impression  that relatively  few do. Most family loans 
and gifts are for human capital, business, or house purchases, not 
acceleration  of consumption  (though  often acceleration  is a secondary 
effect). 
If families could solve the problem  of oversaving  but choose not to 
do so, it raises  the question  of whether  the problem  exists. One  possibil- 
ity is that  the desired  level of consumption  for the young  is not very far 
above actual  consumption,  so that  the burden  of the net worth  constraint 
is  low.  Hubbard and Judd's model considers life-cycle patterns in 
consumption  related to family size, but not related strictly to age. If 
people in their twenties normally  choose simpler  life-styles than those 
in their thirties  and older do, then Hubbard  and Judd  have overstated 
the amount  of oversaving  and  its welfare  costs. 
A second  possibility,  and  the one I take  more  seriously,  is that  families 
remain  paternalistic  long after their offspring  reach official adulthood. 
Parents  don't let their  young adult  children  consume out of their  future 
income expectations  until  they have proven  themselves. Or  the parents 
enforce their  own views about  limiting  consumption  by refusing  to lend 
or to make  gifts. 
Hubbard  and  Judd  make  some  cautious  comments  about  modifications 
in social security to take account of oversaving. They suggest a more 
progressive  payroll  tax. In terms  of their  model, a better  idea  is to excuse 
the young from the tax and to pay them benefits instead. Under the 
optimal plan in the light of their model, social security would pay 
beneficiaries  until they reach age thirty, collect taxes until they retire, 
and then pay benefits again. An individual's implicit debt to social 
security could not be discharged  in bankruptcy,  so negative net worth 
would be feasible. Such a system would avoid a good deal of the 
oversaving that takes place in the economy today, according to the 
model. 
Some retirement  systems do not require  contributions  from workers 
under  age thirty, so there is some recognition  of the point Hubbard  and 
Judd  raise. However, I think  it is safe to predict  that a proposal  to pay 
social security  benefits  to young  adults  would  not attract  a single  vote in 
Congress. Underconsumption  and oversaving by the young is  not 
perceived  as a national  problem  at all. 
The paper demonstrates  very effectively that consumers' flexibility 
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life-cycle consumption  issues. If the public substitutes  easily between 
present  and  future  consumption-that is, if the elasticity  of intertemporal 
substitution  is high-the  welfare  costs of underconsumption  among  the 
young  are small.  My own work  on this point suggests  that  intertemporal 
substitution  is low. I think, for example, that the most relevant line in 
table 3 is the last, where constraints  have the largest  effects. That is, I 
am skeptical  that  underconsumption  is such a problem,  but  to the extent 
that  it occurs, it is costly to welfare  because people strongly  prefer  level 
consumption  paths. 
Similarly,  I believe that  a shift  from  interest  taxation  to wage  taxation, 
in which the wage tax bears fully on the young (illustrated  in table 4), 
may  depress  welfare,  despite the case for a consumption  tax in a perfect 
economy. Again, this endorsement  is qualified  by my skepticism  about 
underconsumption. 
With  respect to the conclusion  in favor  of an exemption  against  labor 
income, shown  in table 6, I choose the  lowest line, which  has the largest 
welfare  gain. My endorsement  on this point is not qualified,  because I 
believe in the exemption on distributional  grounds anyway. If the 
exemption  has  an  efficiencyjustification  as well, along  the  lines suggested 
by Hubbard  and  Judd,  so much  the better. 
Again, I congratulate  the authors  for pushing  their analysis of over- 
saving  so far. I still  give a lot of weight  to the decisions made  by millions 
of families  when  they choose not to solve the  problem  themselves.  Those 
families  obviously don't agree with the premises of this analysis. Yet I 
have to concede that Hubbard  and  Judd  have persuaded  me that, to the 
extent there are unsolved problems of  liquidity constraints, many 
important  conclusions  about  fiscal  policy emerge. 
Lawrence Summers: Glenn Hubbard  and Kenneth Judd's ambitious 
paper  attempts  to make  the case that  liquidity  constraints  are  of pervasive 
importance  for the positive and  normative  analysis  of fiscal  policies. The 
authors  suggest  that  a number  of traditional  conclusions  about  alternative 
fiscal  policies need to be reassessed in light  of the recognition  that  many 
consumers  are liquidity  constrained.  In particular,  they conclude that 
under some circumstances  capital taxation may be welfare-improving 
and that  progressive  taxes may enhance economic efficiency  as well as 
equity. I am largely convinced that Hubbard  and Judd's conclusions 
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assumptions  to conclusions  is a very short  one. On the other  hand, it is 
far from clear to me that the assumptions  made by Hubbard  and Judd 
are  sufficiently  realistic  to permit  any  but  the  most  remarkable  intellectual 
athlete  to  jump  from  their  results  to  judgments  about  the world. 
Let me  begin  by motivating  the  Hubbard-Judd  argument  in  a somewhat 
different way than they do. In traditional  microeconomic  theory the 
deadweight  loss from  taxation  is of literally  second-order  importance.  It 
depends  on the square  of the tax rate, so the first  little bit of tax burden 
has no welfare  implications.  This  argument  presumes,  however, that  but 
for the introduction  of taxes, the economy is at an optimal  competitive 
equilibrium.  Once preexisting distortions are introduced, taxes have 
first-order  effects on economic welfare  that, it is reasonable  to suppose, 
are more  important  than  second-order  effects. Hence the analysis  of the 
effect of taxes in environments  where there are preexisting  distortions 
would seem to be a high priority for public finance research. Yet 
surprisingly  little of it has been done. 
Hubbard  and  Judd  are  to be applauded  for  attempting  such  an  analysis. 
The  preexisting  distortion  on which  they  focus is the presence  of liquidity 
constraints. The argument  is that individuals  systematically  consume 
less early in life and more late in life than they wish because liquidity 
constraints  preclude  their  borrowing  to smooth  consumption  in the way 
that they would like. The absence of a consumer loan market  is the 
failure  of the standard  competitive  assumptions  that  drives  their  analysis. 
Because of the constraints,  individuals  are  unable  to satisfy  the standard 
requirement  that  the marginal  utility  of a dollar  devoted  to consumption 
early in life and that of a dollar  devoted to consumption  late in life be 
equalized. Because the marginal  utility of consumption  is higher  early 
in life, any policy that raises the after-tax  income of the young relative 
to the after-tax  income of the old raises welfare. The average  recipient 
of capital income is older than the average recipient of labor income. 
Hence the liquidity-constraint  consideration  works  to make  capital  taxes 
look good. The old are richer than the young, so progressive  taxation 
also redistributes  in a favorable  way. 
To state the argument  is to highlight  its indirection.  We usually  think 
of intragenerational  rather than intergenerational  equity as being of 
dominant  importance  in thinking  about  progressive  taxation.  The shifts 
in the tax burden  between capital and labor have many consequences 
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and  labor.  Hubbard  and  Judd  shrink  from  some of the direct  implications 
of a finding  that liquidity  constraints  are an important  distortion  in the 
economy. Neither progressive taxation nor capital taxation seems a 
natural  instrument  to dedicate  to this  problem.  I  A more  direct  alternative 
would be reversing  the direction  of transfers  under  the social security 
system or, more modestly, allowing individuals to use their social 
security  benefits  as collateral  and  borrow.  Extending  to Sears-Roebuck 
the sort of long arm of the law that is exercised on behalf of welfare 
mothers  would  also relax  liquidity  constraints.  Granting  for the moment 
the social importance  of liquidity constraints, I think they should be 
attacked  through  means much more direct  than increasing  the progres- 
sivity of the tax system. 
But a much  more  profound  problem  with the Hubbard-Judd  analysis 
is that it pushes the standard  intertemporal  utility maximization  model 
of consumption  well past the breaking  point. The authors  are quick to 
attribute  any deviation from the predictions  of the model to liquidity 
constraints  that  they then  regard  as a distortion.  It is this conclusion  that 
drives  their  results.  An alternative  interpretation  of the close relationship 
between  consumption  and  income  would  deny  the  premise  that  individual 
behavior  is well captured  by the intertemporal  maximization  hypothesis. 
In this case, IHubbard  and Judd's welfare calculations would not be 
appropriate. 
Let me illustrate  this  point. l here  is a tradition  at the Brookings  Panel 
of discussants  presenting  handouts  of empirical  work hot off the com- 
puter. I want to do some real-time  empirical  work in keeping  with the 
long lead times you usually  receive on my papers. How many  people in 
this room have already made their full IRA contribution  for tax year 
1986,  the one due in April 1987?  Raise your hand  if you have. [Editors' 
note: fewer than  half of the participants  raised  their  hands.] As I would 
have guessed, many  have not. And I suspect that  it would  be difficult  in 
most cases to rationalize  your hesitation by pointing  to liquidity  con- 
straints,  even though  for alinost all of us it would be rational  to put the 
money  away  now. Some sort  of preference  for  liquidity  or some difficulty 
in making  decisions must  explain  our  behavior.  Neither  is well captured 
1. I discuss  instrument  choice  in  the  context  of savings  policy  in  Lawrence  H. Summers, 
"Issues in National  Savings  Policy," in F. Gerard  Adams  and Susan  M. Wachter,  eds., 
Savings and Capital Formation:  The Policy  Options (D.C.  Heath and Co.,  1986), pp. 65- 
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by the intertemporal  maximization  model used in this paper. Either 
would lead to rejections  of the life-cycle model like those described  in 
the  paper.  This  suggests  that  it may  be unrealistic  to assume  that  liquidity 
constraints  are  the explanation  for  evidence  suggesting  that  consumption 
and  income are closely associated. 
The point can be  made more strongly. America's largest social 
program,  social security,  is premised  to no small  degree  on the view that 
individuals  are not rational in preparing  for old age and need to be 
coerced to do so. The existence of TIAA-CREF  as a custodian of the 
retirement  funds of many of us in this room is due to a conviction that 
college professors cannot be trusted to save enough for their own or 
their  spouses' old age. If important,  these behavior  patterns  are  likely to 
dwarf liquidity  constraints  in explaining  consumption  and saving. In- 
deed, liquidity constraints arise in no small part from rules that are 
explicitly  designed  to prevent  the profligate  from  getting  in too far over 
their heads. Hubbard and Judd assume these considerations away 
entirely on their way to favoring tax reforms that would redistribute 
wealth toward  the young. (I wonder  what their  view will be twenty-five 
years from now.) Most of us shrink  from the direct implication  of the 
Hubbard-Judd  view of liquidity  constraints,  and  I think  this  is the reason 
why. 
Although  I have focused primarily  on the normative  component of 
the Hubbard-Judd  paper, the paper also addresses positive issues 
regarding  the importance  of deficits. I want to underscore  one point it 
makes that parallels  a conclusion I came to in some work with James 
Poterba:  the issue of the finiteness  of life is not important  in evaluating 
the economic effects of budget deficits.2  Human lives, while short in 
terms of geological time, are long in terms of economic time. While 
government debt policies shift liabilities to future generations and 
therefore  affect consumers' wealth and consumption,  the effect is not 
empirically  consequential  except for extremely  long-lived  deficits. The 
vast majority  of the debt  incurred  during  World  War  II was repaid  within 
the lifetime  of persons alive at the time the war was fought. The same is 
likely to be true for those of us alive during  the current  debt buildup. 
2. James  Poterba  and  Lawrence  Summers,  "The  Macroeconomic  Irrelevance  of Finite 
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Hubbard  and  Judd  correctly  focus the debate  over Ricardian  equivalence 
on the question  of the consumption-income  relationship  rather  than on 
the nature  of bequest  motives. 
I conclude  with a methodological  note. I wonder  how much  we learn 
about tax policies from simulation studies of stylized economics of 
identical  individuals  who differ  only by the date of their  death and save 
only by directly  holding  riskless capital.  Using computers  to expand  the 
back of one's envelope is one thing, but heeding the results is quite 
another.  Anyone who has paid any attention  to tax debates  cannot  help 
but be struck by the irrelevance  of measures of excess burden  to the 
participants.  Perhaps  this reflects failures  of education  by economists. 
More likely it reflects the weight given to issues other than economic 
efficiency  in  the standard  sense of the  term.  In  neither  event  is it especially 
helpful to  measure efficiency in ever more complicated simulation 
models.  Rather,  I would  hope that  economists  would  turn  their  attention 
to examining  the effects of tax policies on economic behavior  without 
the prism  of optimization  theory used in so many studies. The theory is 
a useful  touchstone, but like a prism  it may distort  more  than  it reflects. 
Someday  we will have a much  greater  understanding  of the effects of tax 
policies on saving behavior, but I doubt very much that it will come 
when we know the true gamma,  delta, or any other Greek  letter of the 
representative  consumer. 
General Discussion 
Acknowledging  that one could quarrel  with details of the authors' 
specification,  James  Tobin  applauded  the  paper  for showing  the potential 
importance  of liquidity  constraints  in thinking  about  tax policy. Gregory 
Mankiw  cautioned  that  available  evidence  may  be insufficient  to establish 
the empirical significance  of liquidity constraints. He noted that the 
evidence cited by Hubbard  and Judd  consists primarily  of findings  that 
consumption  exhibits excess sensitivity to changes in income, and he 
argued  that  existing  statistical  tests are  potentially  biased  in favor  of that 
finding. Standard  test procedures assume that income is  stationary 
around a deterministic trend; they are invalid if income follows a 
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Hubbard  responded  that  the  low levels of assets held  by many  households 
and of unsecured consumer debt relative to collateralized  debt also 
favored  the liquidity-constraint  interpretation  of the data. 
Several members  of the panel took exception to the inference  drawn 
by the formal discussants that liquidity constraints affecting young 
households were probably not important,  because if they were, the 
political  process and other  institutions  would  have created  mechanisms 
to transfer  resources  to those households. Charles  Schultze noted that, 
as a teacher at a public university, he was sensitive to the fact that 
society and politicians had indeed found it worthwhile to  transfer 
resources to individuals  in their late teens and early twenties. William 
Brainard observed that some academic institutions have begun to 
recognize  the mismatch  between earnings  and consumption  needs over 
the life cycle. At Yale and some other universities,  the retirement  plan 
contributions  required  fromjunior  faculty  members  are  lower  than  those 
required  from  senior  faculty  members.  The  political  pressure  for student 
loan programs  can be similarly  interpreted.  William  Branson  noted that 
the negative income tax, an idea that at one point enjoyed a certain 
political  appeal, would have transferred  income from older workers  to 
younger  workers. 
Several  discussants  provided  arguments  against  shifting  income  from 
older  to younger  individuals.  Martin  Baily  commented  that  many  parents 
choose not to give their adolescent and young adult  children  money to 
spend on increased consumption, fearing that such transfers might 
interfere  with the development  of good work  habits.  A similar  argument 
can be made against  the transfer  of public funds to the young. Robert 
Gordon  cautioned  against  altering  the tax structure  to flatten  the profile 
of take-home  pay over the life cycle, noting  that  incentive  considerations 
might  make  it optimal  for an employer  to defer  earnings  from  early  until 
late in an employee's tenure  with the firm.  Changes  in the tax structure 
that increased the relative take-home pay of junior workers might 
interfere  with this sort of incentive scheme. Katharine  Abraham  cited 
evidence  that  earnings  grow  more  rapidly  than  productivity  not  just with 
time on a specific job,  but also with age. This evidence cannot be 
explained  by implicit  contracts  such as those to which Gordon  referred, 
but may reflect a  more general societal consensus concerning the 
appropriate  path of earnings  over the life cycle. If individuals  derive 
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ham continued, the conclusions of a welfare analysis of the sort in 
Hubbard  and  Judd's  paper  could be altered. 
Abraham  also  commented  that  the  introduction  of large-scale  transfers 
from  older  workers  to younger  workers  would  reduce  the lifetime  utility 
of today's older  workers,  who have already  passed the age at which  they 
might  benefit  from the program.  Even if such transfers  could produce 
steady-state  welfare  gains, the distribution  of losses and  gains from  the 
introduction  of the program  could block its passage. In contrast, most 
people of voting  age in 1935  stood to benefit  from  the introduction  of the 
social security  system. 
Alan Blinder  noted that Hubbard  and Judd  have modeled  only those 
liquidity  constraints  arising  from  the divergence  of the typical  individu- 
al's desired life-cycle consumption  profile from the typical life-cycle 
income profile. Unexpected shocks to  earnings, such as  might be 
experienced during  an extended spell of unemployment,  are another 
potentially  important  source  of liquidity  constraints.  Hubbard  responded 
that  the simulations  reported  in the paper  were intended  to yield lower- 
bound estimates of the welfare benefits that might  be obtained  by tax 
changes that relieved those constraints.  He also commented  that aug- 
menting  the basic model to incorporate  uncertainty  and the possibility 
that workers might hold precautionary  balances would probably not 
affect  the basic  policy conclusions  but  might  make  the simulated  capital- 
to-output  ratios  more  realistic. 